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ABSTRACT
This Article proposes a marriage or integration of two seemingly
parallel economic and monetary spheres. These include first, the
crypto-economy (which has sometimes been described as a sphere of
economic and monetary activities that lies beyond the rule of law or
reflecting a novel type of capitalism unshackled from current
institutions), and second, the role of central banks, in particular the
European System of Central Banks (“ESCB”). It argues that the
crypto-economy can benefit from engaging with a programmable
central bank digital euro, and that the ESCB would also benefit from
being able to test a limited rollout of the central bank digital euro in
the crypto-economy.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 254
I. DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY THINKING ON CENTRAL BANK
DIGITAL CURRENCIES ......................................................................... 257
II. THE PARTICULAR RELEVANCE OF CBDC TO THE DAPP ECONOMY 269
A. The Evolution of the dApp Economy ................................... 270
B. The Structures of the dApp Economy .................................. 276
Professor of Corporate Law and Financial Regulation, University College
London, PhD, LLM (Cambridge). This Article is based on research commissioned
under the European Central Bank’s Legal Research Programme 2020. Many thanks
to Dr. Chiara Zilioli, General Counsel, European Central Bank, and her team for
comments and feedback on an earlier draft. All errors and omissions are mine.
*

253

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2021

1

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2 [2021], Art. 12
2_Final_Updated_Master Copy_5.3.21_Chiu_Building Out the Crypto economy camera ready (Do Not Delete)6/23/2021 9:44 AM

254 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51
C. The Problems with the Monetary Order of the
dApp Economy ......................................................................... 280
1. Weaknesses of Private Cryptocurrencies as Money ..... 282
2. Stablecoins as Market-based Response ........................ 285
D. CBDCs as Lynchpin for the Development of the
DApp Economy: The Paradigm of Regulatory Capitalism ..... 296
III. CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL EURO AS AN EXPERIMENT FOR
LIMITED ROLLOUT IN THE DAPP ECONOMY OF THE SINGLE
EUROPEAN MARKET ........................................................................... 298
A. The Legal Framework for Issuance of CBDC for the
Euro Area ................................................................................ 306
B. Institutional Structure for Issuance of CBDC in the
European System of Central Banks ......................................... 309
C. A Brief Blueprint for the Regulatory Design and
Architecture Implications for Supporting and Regulating
the dApp Economy in the European Single Market ................. 312
1. The Rise of New Intermediaries for
Facilitating Investment in the dApp Economy .................. 313
2. The Need for a Complementary Regime of
ICO Regulation ................................................................. 315
3. The Need to Consider More Broadly Business
and Commercial Policy for the dApp Economy ................ 321
4. The Need to Consider Regulatory Intersections
and Coordination at National and E.U. Levels ................ 322
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 325
INTRODUCTION
An unregulated but thriving space, often known as the “cryptoeconomy,” 1 is increasingly populated with “decentralized application”
(“dApp”) business developers innovating to promote peer-to-peer
commerce supported by blockchain infrastructure. 2 The economic
potential of the dApp economy can be mobilized with institutional
1. See generally ANDREW ROMANS, MASTERS OF BLOCKCHAIN AND INITIAL
COIN OFFERINGS (2018).
2. This is a type of distributed ledger built by appending blocks of data to form
one complete ledger shared amongst all nodes. See generally MICHÈLE FINCK,
BLOCKCHAIN REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE (2018).
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support. This Article argues that support from the public sector can be
beneficial and mobilizing, drawing upon the framework of regulatory
capitalism. 3 We propose an integration of the dApp economy (which
has sometimes been described as a sphere of economic and monetary
activities that lies beyond the rule of law 4 or reflecting a novel type of
capitalism unshackled from current institutions), 5 and the role of
central banks, specifically the European System of Central Banks
(“ESCB”). We focus on a particular starting point, that is, an
enabling 6 legal framework for the dApp economy anchored upon the
provision of a digital fiat currency issued by a central bank for
investment.
This Article argues that central bank digital currency (“CBDC”)
could be targeted at the dApp economy as a “limited rollout” for
primary investment purposes. The CBDC has been discussed
predominantly in relation to mainstream economic and financial
activities, but challenges are recognized for its rollout as replacement
for the physical circulation of cash. A limited rollout provides an
experimental space for central banks and dApp economy developers,
bridging a new technologically-developed economic space with a
public sector institution of old. This Article suggests that the limited
rollout can be tried in the European context, as the euro, being a
common currency of the euro area, provides an excellent starting point
for the building out of the dApp economy, which is generally regarded
as borderless and global. Further, European policy-making is situated
within an institutional framework that promotes the building of a
Single Market for the European economy, 7 providing a leadership
3. See infra Part II.
4. Thibault Schrepel, Anarchy, State, and Blockchain Utopia: Rule of Law
versus Lex Cryptographia, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND DIGITALISATION (Hart
Publishing 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3485436.
5. John Flood & Lachlan Robb, Trust, Anarcho-Capitalism, Blockchain and
Initial Coin Offerings (Griffith U. L. Sch. Research Paper No. 17–23, U.
Westminster Sch. L. Research Paper, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3074263.
6. Regulation enables economic activities to be carried out, organized, and
legitimized. See generally Barak Orbach, What is Regulation?, 30 YALE J. ON REG.
1 (2012).
7. Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union
art.
26,
2012/C
236/01,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT.
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example of policy-making across borders and boundaries amongst
tightly-coupled economies. This discussion also provides relevant
insights for the United States. For the United States, the central bank
digital dollar can provide a starting point for mobilizing the dApp
economy, and leverage upon its still-accepted status as the global
reserve currency. 8 The central bank digital dollar could also facilitate
the building out of a federal framework for governing key aspects of
the dApp economy, such as payment business regulation, securities
and fundraising regulations, as well as exchange and market
regulations. These aspects will be mapped out in the European
example in Part III of this Article. Although this Article chooses to
discuss the central bank digital euro in detail as the example for
implementation of the CBDC for the dApp economy, the progression
of the Article in relation to the development of the dApp economy, its
market failures, and the role of a CBDC are generally applicable for
policy thinking whether in Europe or beyond.
Part I provides a review of current policy thinking on the CBDC
to be used in the mainstream economy. It is observed that central
banks have moved from the “research” phase for digital currencies to
a phase for exploring operationalization, despite the many challenges
that were canvassed in the research phase not definitely addressed.
Central banks seem intent on targeting CBDC for mainstream ecommerce, and possibly global trade and retail. 9 However, this Article
urges central banks to consider aiming an experimental rollout of
CBDC at the dApp economy in order to test demand, and the
efficiency and security of its workings. Such a limited proposal is
based on a win-win agenda for both central banks and developers in
the dApp economy. Moreover, the genesis for central bankers’ interest
in CBDC lies in the rise of cryptocurrencies that serve payment and
other transactional functions in the dApp economy. 10

8. Kimberly Amadeo, Why the US Dollar Is the Global Currency, BALANCE
(July 23, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/world-currency-3305931.
9. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES:
FOUNDATIONAL
PRINCIPLES
AND
CORE
FEATURES
(2020),
https://www.bis.org/publ/othp33.htm [hereinafter BIS].
10. Dirk Bullman, Jonas Klemm & Andrea Pinna, In Search for Stability in
Crypto-assets: Are Stablecoins the Solution? (ECB Occasional Paper No. 230,
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3444847.
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Part II explains why the CBDC is especially relevant to the dApp
economy. It discusses the market failures of self-governing solutions
in the dApp economy—including reliance on private
cryptocurrencies—and argues that a public sector solution in the form
of CBDC can be enabling in nature. This Article also provides a
survey of stablecoin developments and the landscape of risks
surrounding them in relation to their currency functions in the dApp
economy. The Article theoretically locates the issuance of CBDC for
the dApp economy within the paradigm of regulatory capitalism and
argues that this paradigm allows us to see how CBDC can play a key
facilitative role in mobilizing the dApp economy for the benefit of
mainstream users at scale. Part II argues that the CBDC is a public
sector solution of an enabling nature, which is beneficial for
mobilizing the dApp economy as a capitalist and governed order.
Finally, Part III explores how such CBDC should be issued and
the implications for the institutional frameworks for governing the
dApp economy. Part III discusses, using the central bank digital euro
as an example, how a CBDC can be rolled out in an experimental
manner in a regional market. As the CBDC would be an enabling or
empowering institution for access to and mobilization of money, it
paves the way for investment into the dApp economy in a manner
consistent with institutional trust for a governed market order. It also
paves the way for a blueprint for the broader institutional implications
of governing the dApp economy, which can be a new and promising
space for economic and financial mobilization. These insights, based
on the experimental central bank digital euro, are potentially useful for
global policy thinking.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY THINKING ON CENTRAL BANK
DIGITAL CURRENCIES
A first question that may be asked in relation to CBDCs is
whether they are needed at all. Privately-created money dominates
money supply 11 in many developed economies and electronic forms of
money transfer and payment have evolved from decades ago. The
digitalization of payment currency has developed over time, from
11. See generally MARY MELLOR, THE FUTURE OF MONEY: FROM FINANCIAL
CRISIS TO PUBLIC RESOURCE (2010).
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payment cards to user-friendly forms of payment led by financial
technologies (“fintechs”) in e-commerce and cashless real
commerce. 12 The digitalization of money in payment cards catered to
the rise of the consumption economy, as credit is bundled with
payment, transforming the nature of relatively accessible consumer
credit. 13 The rise of e-commerce further fueled demand for digital
forms of payment and the rise of fintechs, the earliest of which may be
Paypal, 14 to serve a globally-linked retail economy. Fintechs,
however, have evolved to challenge the inefficiencies of payment and
remittance monopolies, 15 galvanizing greater adoption of cashless
transfers. 16 The continuous movement of innovation in the fintech
space shows that we are not lacking in digital payment interfaces and
the digitalization of money. Hence, it is queried as to why we may
need a public good in the form of the CBDC as we foster an open and
competitive space in electronic money and payment innovations. 17
Earlier research into CBDC focused on how consumers demand
money, 18 taking into consideration whether CBDC should replace
12. Peter Gomber et al., On the Fintech Revolution: Interpreting the Forces of
Innovation, Disruption and Transformation in Financial Services, 35 J. MGMT.
INFO. SYS. 220–265 (2018).
13. See generally Gillian Garcia, Credit Cards: An Interdisciplinary Survey, 6
J. CONSUMER RES. 327 (1980).
14. See Paypal, https://www.paypal.com/uk/home; see also Kerry L
MacIntosh, The New Money, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 659 (1999) (for an early piece
noting the need for digital money beyond credit cards for e-commerce); Lawrence J.
Trautman, E-Commerce, Cyber, and Electronic Payment System Risks: Lessons
from Paypal, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 261 (2016).
15. See generally Iris H-Y Chiu, A New Era in Fintech Payment Innovations?
A Perspective from the Institutions and Regulation of Payment Systems, 9 L.
INNOVATION & TECH. 190 (2017).
16. See,
e.g.,
The
Business
Research
Company,
https://www.thebusinessresearchcompany.com/report/fintech-market.
17. See The role of the Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market,
amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation
(EU) No. 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC (Payment Services
Directive 2015).
18. Christian Barontini & Henry Holden, Proceeding with Caution – A Survey
on Central Bank Digital Currency (BIS Paper No. 101, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3331590; Tanai Khiaonarong & David Humphrey, Cash
Use Across Countries and the Demand for Central Bank Digital Currency (IMF
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physical cash. CBDC can be regarded as a cost-effective means to
replace cash, which can be perceived as inefficient because of the
need for its physical production and replacement, as well as risks in
terms of its physical handling, relating to loss, theft, and
counterfeiting. 19 Decreased demand for cash and consumer preference
for electronic payments also seem to underlie the Swedish central
bank’s experiment with CBDC. 20 However, commentators raise the
fear of financial exclusion for those used to cash and not familiar with
digital interfaces. 21 In this manner, the financial inclusion rationale22
for CBDC may be weakened. Indeed, central bankers, 23 in proceeding
to an operational phase for CBDCs, have decided not to treat the
CBDC as a substitute for cash, but to maintain the co-existence of
CBDC and cash as a matter of principle in order to promote choice. 24
Thus, it can be argued that the public good perception of CBDC
would not be the total digitalization of money, but rather, an attempt
to possibly correct the market failures or to improve on market
inefficiencies in relation to private sector-issued digital money and
payment systems.
But what are the market failures or inefficiencies in relation to
private sector-issued digital money? It can be argued that one area of
market failure lies in the breakdown of trust between financial
participants and institutions in relation to cross-border payments and
remittances within the frameworks of anti-fraud and anti-money

Working Paper, 2019), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/03/01/
Cash-Use-Across-Countries-and-the-Demand-for-Central-Bank-Digital-Currency46617 (demonstrating an opposing view, i.e., the need for physical cash amongst
populations).
19. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal & Vadhindran Rao, Stable
Cryptocurrencies: First Order Principles, STANFORD J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y
(2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701.
20. Dylan Love, Sweden Is Testing Its New Central Bank Digital Currency,
COINTELEGRAPH (Feb. 20, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/sweden-is-testingits-new-central-bank-digital-currency.
21. Khiaonarong & Humphrey, supra note 18.
22. David Andolfatto, Assessing the Impact of Central Bank Digital Currency
on Private Banks (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper 2018-026B,
2018), https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2018.026.
23. See BIS, supra note 9.
24. Id.
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laundering compliance. 25 For example, users of consumer credit cards
have faced blocked payments or card freezes when attempting to make
payment in a foreign jurisdiction or purchasing from an online retailer
based overseas. 26 The needs of regulatory compliance for financial
institutions, with rules against money laundering that entail strict
liability,27 promote skepticism due to each financial institution’s own
legal risk. This can result in the break-down of coordination amongst
financial institutions, adversely affecting the smoothness of money
flows. On the one hand, such hiccups in money flows serve to protect
financial institutions from legal risk, but on the other, private sector
financial institutions could improve on coordination in order to
efficiently detect real instances of financial crime or fraud instead of
false positives. The regulatory demands of anti-money laundering
have resulted in a fragmented landscape of trust between international
financial institutions such as banks and remittance providers. Banks in
many jurisdictions are risk averse that regulatory compliance by
correspondent financial institutions may be inadequate, therefore
enhancing their regulatory risks. This has resulted in the decline of
correspondent banking for higher-risk jurisdictions and potential
financial exclusion in an indiscriminate manner. 28
Even where policy initiatives have brought about architectural and
standardization advantages, such as in the Single European Payments
25. See generally Emily Lee, Financial Inclusion: A Challenge to the New
Paradigm of Financial Technology, Regulatory Technology and Anti-Money
Laundering Law, 6 J. BUS. LAW 473 (discussing some effects of de-risking by
financial institutions due to anti-money laundering compliance). Effects of derisking, such as exclusions and access problems, inevitably create barriers to
efficiency in financial transactions, creating a balance that needs to be struck. Id.
26. Stephen Little, One in four holidaymakers have had their credit card
PAGES
(June
1,
2017),
blocked
whilst
abroad,
MONEY
https://www.themoneypages.com/latest-news/one-in-four-holidaymakers-has-hadtheir-credit-card-blocked-whilst-abroad/.
27. See, e.g., U.K. Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, § 328 (example of a law that
can be used to incriminate banks that engage in “arrangements” that facilitate money
laundering. Although the mental elements of “know or suspect” is mentioned in the
section, the threshold for suspicion is relatively low); see also Lonsdale v National
Westminster Bank Plc [2018] EWHC 1843 (QB).
28. FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, FSB ACTION PLAN TO ASSESS AND
ADDRESS THE DECLINE IN CORRESPONDENT BANKING (May 2019),
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P290519-1.pdf.
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Area, 29 it is arguable that the efficiency of cross-border payments
within the Single Market—especially the euro area—can be
improved. 30 Expected smoothness in the outworking of payment
services can particularly be put to the test where a payment services
institution fails. For example, the failure of German payment services
provider Wirecard resulted in uncoordinated approaches by different
regulators, leaving consumers in markedly inconvenient positions.31
The harmonization of laws and architecture may still run up against
the fragmentation of national supervision and coordination if a
regulated entity becomes mired in crisis.
The invention of bitcoin—the first private cryptocurrency that can
be transferred in a cryptographically secure manner across a peer-topeer network—in 2009 32 arguably opened up a space for the migration
of financial transfers that could have been impeded in mainstream
financial architecture. Doubtless the transfers of illicit money in
bitcoin have been discussed at length, 33 and criminals are even
demanding ransom in bitcoin in order to retrieve their ill-gotten gains
pseudonymously, 34 yet, the availability of cryptocurrency blockchains
29. Single Euro Payments Area (“SEPA”) Regulation (EU) No 260/2012. See
generally JAKUB GÓRKA, TRANSFORMING PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN EUROPE (2016).
30. See European Association of Cooperative Banks (EACB),The European
Banking Federation (EBF) & European Savings and Retail Banking Group (ESBG),
Payments Policy for Europe: Direction for the Next Five Years (2020),
https://www.finextra.com/finextra-downloads/newsdocs/ecsas-policy-paperpayments.pdf.
31. Nicholas Megaw, UK consumers dragged into Wirecard’s collapse,
FINANCIAL TIMES (June 29, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/dbe16ce4-f1544985-a210-279fa1f53e24 (reporting on the freezing of customers’ accounts, which
the FCA subsequently intervened into following customer complaints, and other
fragmented scrambles in other countries following the German fintech company’s
collapse); see also Stefania Palma, Ex-Wirecard clients scramble to process
TIMES
(Oct.
12,
2020),
payments
in
Singapore,
FINANCIAL
https://www.ft.com/content/3ed31549-a012-4bd4-a130-696790027b7e.
32. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer to Peer Electronic Cash System
(2008), available at https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
33. Damodaran Appukuttan Nair, The Bitcoin Innovation, Crypto Currencies
and the Leviathan, 9 INNOVATION & DEVELOPMENT 85–103 (2019); Braeden K
Anderson, Regulating the Future of Finance and Money: A Rational U.S.
Regulatory Approach to Maximizing the Value of Crypto-Assets and Blockchain
Systems, 11 BOCCONI LEGAL PAPERS 1 (2018).
34. AA v Persons Unknown and Bitfinex [2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm).
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have also provided an enabling mechanism for those excluded from
mainstream financial structures, 35 many through reasons beyond their
control. 36 Further, private cryptocurrency offers choice where
governments are perceived to misuse monetary policy. 37 Even in
developed economies where interest rates have remained low for too
long, 38 ordinary citizens can engage in the opportunities for saving in
cryptocurrency, such as privately issued crypto stablecoins. 39
Interest in the development of the CBDC can thus be attributed to
the following context: the confluence of coordinative inefficiencies
and market failures in payment and remittance operationalized by the
conventional financial sector, and the rise of the programmable
cryptocurrency that can be transferred from peer-to-peer wallets on
permissionless blockchains that are not publicly policed. 40
In connection with the public good analysis of the CBDC as
overcoming market failures and inefficiencies in privately-supplied
35. Armine Soufaih, Revolutionizing International Remittance Payments
Using Cryptocurrency and Blockchain-based Technology, SOCIAL IMPACT
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE (SIRE) 75 (2020), https://repository.upenn.edu/sire/75;
Rajendra Kulkarni et al., Cryptocurrency, Stablecoins and Blockchain: Exploring
Digital Money Solutions for Remittances and Inclusive Economies (66th Annual
North American Meetings of the Regional Science Association International (13–16
Nov,
2019),
Pittsburgh,
PA,
USA,
2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3511139.
36. Jay Hao, Financial Inclusion, Cryptocurrency and the Developing World,
COINTELEGRAPH (June 25, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/financialinclusion-cryptocurrency-and-the-developing-world.
37. Max Raskin, Fahad Saleh & David Yermack, How Do Private Digital
Currencies Affect Government Policy? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working Paper
No. 26219, 2019), http://www.nber.org/papers/w26219.
38. Nares Laopannarai, Can the Fed’s Prolonged Low-Interest Rates Lead
(Aug.
31,
2020),
Bitcoin
to
the
Upside?,
SUPERCRYPTONEWS
https://www.supercryptonews.com/fed-prolonged-low-interest-rates-lead-bitcoin-tothe-upside/.
39. See infra Part II.
40. The Bank of England in particular has a pressing need to reform
conventional payment systems, especially international remittance in order to
address the fragmentation and break-downs between financial institutions leading to
market failures. The development of the CBDC is seen as one avenue of exploration
for reform. See Victoria Cleland, Cross-border payments – innovating in a changing
world (Speech, Central Banks Payment Conference, Oct. 13, 2020),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2020/victoria-cleland-keynotepresentation-at-the-central-bank-payments-conference-2020.
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payment services, CBDC could be supplied for payment in ecommerce and remittance, in an account-based design, i.e., where
accounts are maintained directly at the central bank by retail users.
The central bank takes on the role of payment intermediation in order
to address the deficiencies of private sector services. In the euro area,
this can be transformative for remittances. Users could make and
receive transfers out of and into their CBDC accounts, 41 vis-á-vis
other CBDC accounts held at the central bank, throughout the regional
market of the euro-area, and across the borders of Member States.
This is arguably revolutionary in supporting the freedom of movement
in the Single Market in terms of human capital movement, ecommerce, peer-to-peer consumption, and even financial services,
such as peer-to-peer crowdlending.
The European Central Bank’s (“ECB”) recent proposal to explore
the operationalization of CBDC is based on the perceived benefits
above. 42 In providing competition with mainstream payment services
providers in this manner, the ECB envisages that there could be
migration from mainstream payment services institutions. However,
financial intermediaries who have hitherto been able to impose rents
on the users of payment systems 43 especially on a cross-border basis
would have to become competitive and seek improvement and
innovation on their services. Central banks on the other hand may
have to be prepared for increased management of user relations,
especially with consumers.
Further, a central bank that adopts an account-based design
benefits from being able to observe payment information and this
assists in anti-money laundering surveillance, although at the price of
privacy. 44 This likely presents a dilemma for users as at scale, the
central bank can be in possession of significant amounts of data
41. Harry Leinonen, Electronic Central Bank Cash: To Be or Not to Be?, 13 J.
PAYMENTS STRATEGY & SYSTEMS 20 (2019).
42. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, REPORT ON A DIGITAL EURO (Oct. 2020),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/html/digitaleuro.en.html.
43. Tommaso Mancini- Griffoli et al., Casting Light on Central Bank Digital
Currency, in CHRIS BRUMMER, CRYPTOASSETS: LEGAL, REGULATORY, AND
MONETARY PERSPECTIVES (2019).
44. Id. Hossein Nabilou, Testing the Waters of the Rubicon: The European
Central Bank and Central Bank Digital Currencies, J. BANKING REGULATION
(2019), https://doi.org/10.1057/s41261-019-00112-1.
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regarding private money flows, and data security and handling can
become of paramount importance and requiring accountability. 45 For
example, the CBDC project rolled out by the Chinese government
may be viewed with some concern due to the propensity for data
collection and the exercise of forms of state control. The issuance of
CBDC is in a pilot phase, limited to four Chinese provinces, and
incumbent financial institutions such as large state-owned banks and
major fintech institutions such as Tencent would be wallet providers
for CBDC. 46 The issuance of CBDC may be a way of regularizing the
uneven landscape in China with its large banking sector being
digitally backward and the fintech sector becoming disproportionately
important in credit creation, money supply, and investment services.
However, an authoritative Chinese commentator 47 takes the view that
CBDC would promote greater security of data and certainty of
payments in retail use, indicating that the interest in CBDC could lie
in achieving greater public sector control over flows of money that are
being dominated by the unevenly regulated fintech sector in China.
Account-based designs could attract depositors, who would see
central banks as fail-safe, and bank runs could be virtually
abolished. 48 Commentators worry about whether this would adversely
affect the credit creation role of banks or indeed this role may be
pushed onto central banks. 49 However, others argue that CBDC
issuance does not have to entail credit operations and financial
customers would still need to turn to commercial banks. 50
Nevertheless, the possibility is raised that central banks may need to
45. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 42.
46. Staff, China’s central bank digital currency wallet is revealed, LEDGER
INSIGHTS (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.ledgerinsights.com/china-digital-currencywallet-dcep-cbdc/.
47. Qian Yao, Central Bank Digital Currency: Optimization of the Currency
System and Its Issuance Design, 12 CHINA ECON. J. 1 (2019).
48. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Dirk Niepelt, On the Equivalence of Private
and Public Money, 106 J. MONETARY ECON. 27 (2019); Alex Cukierman, Welfare
and Political Economy Aspects of a Central Bank Digital Currency (Centre for
Econ.
Pol’y
Res.
Discussion
Paper
No.
13728,
2019),
https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13728.
49. Young Sik Kim & Ohik Kwon, Central Bank Digital Currency and
Financial
Stability
(Bank
of
Korea
Working
Paper,
2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3330914.
50. Brunnermeier & Niepelt, supra note 48.
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invest “back” into commercial banks to support their roles in the
private creation of money so that credit is available for economic
development. 51 CBDC issuance can also provide competition in
relation to the deposit-taking services provided by commercial banks
and they may raise account interest rates to attract deposits. 52 In the
alternative, to avoid disproportionate inflows into CBDC from the
private sector, the remuneration of CBDC could be set at a decreasing
level for high balances, including a negative tier beyond a certain
threshold. 53
It is arguable that the availability of a CBDC facilitates certain
novel fiscal and monetary policies. Account-based CBDC designs
provide novel benefits such as direct monetary policy, where central
banks could make helicopter money drops or experiment further with
negative interest rates in order to affect consumption behavior.54
Fiscal policy can be integrated into account-based CBDC as CBDC
can be issued based on government debt. 55 In light of the needs for
economies battered by lock-down policies in the wake of the Covid-19
pandemic, CBDC has been discussed as part of possible fiscal
stimulation policies. 56 It may be argued that fiscal policies are outside
of the remit of central banks. However, a recent development in the
United States in expanding the Federal Reserve’s role in combatting
the adverse economic effects during the Covid-19 pandemic shows
that central banks are regarded as important partner agencies in fiscal

51. Kim & Kwon, supra note 49.
52. Andolfatto, supra note 22; Jonathan Chiu et al., Central Bank Digital
Currency and Banking (Bank of Canada Working Paper, 2019),
https://ideas.repec.org/p/red/sed019/862.html.
53. Ulrich Bindseil, Tiered CBDC and the Financial System (European
Central
Bank
Working
Paper
No.
2351,
2020),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2351~c8c18bbd60.en.pdf.
54. Id. See also Nabilou, supra note 44.
55. Michael Kumhof & Clare Noone, Central Bank Digital Currencies –
Design Principles and Balance Sheet Implications (Bank of England Working
Paper, 2018), www.bankofengland.co.uk/working-paper/Working-papers suggest
that CBDC should not be convertible into bank deposits.
56. Nikhilesh De, US Lawmakers Talk Digital Dollar, FedAccounts in
Thursday Hearing, COINDESK (June 10, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/watch-uslawmakers-will-talk-digital-dollar-fedaccounts-in-thursday-hearing.
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policies. The CARES Act 2020 57 provided for the Federal Reserve’s
powers to support not only liquidity in debt markets, but also lending
to small and medium sized businesses. The Federal Reserve in the
United States introduced the Main Street Lending Program (“MSLP”)
that provides support to small and mid-size non-financial firms hit by
the pandemic. 58 The MSLP allows the Federal Reserve to set up
special purpose vehicles to purchase participations in bank business
loans, therefore supporting private financial sector lending to nonfinancial businesses, as long as they have been financially healthy
prior to the pandemic. In effect, the U.S. Federal Reserve and the
Treasury are legislatively empowered to act as guarantors while
private sector banks underwrite and allocate credit. 59
The concerns about the dominance and expanding remits of
central banks in an account-based design may direct us to consider a
bearer or token-based design of issuance. 60 In a bearer or token-based
57. U.S. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act),
H.R. 748, 116th Cong., § 3548 (2020).
58. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, MAIN
STREET
LENDING
PROGRAM
(Sept.
8,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mainstreetlending.htm.
The
Program provides the following facilities: the Main Street New Loan Facility
(MSNLF), the Main Street Priority Loan Facility (MSPLF), the Main Street
Expanded Loan Facility (MSELF), the Nonprofit Organization New Loan Facility
(NONLF), and the Nonprofit Organization Expanded Loan Facility (NOELF).
Loans will be offered by banks, who retain 5 percent of the loan and sell the
remaining 95 percent to one of three Main Street facilities (the New Loan Facility,
the Priority Loan Facility, and the Expanded Loan Facility). These facilities vary by
the type of loan such as loan size, borrower leverage, and whether the loan is new or
expands an existing loan. All Main Street loans have a five-year maturity, deferring
interest payments for one year and principal payments for two years, can be prepaid
without penalty, and have a loan rate of LIBOR plus 3 percentage points. See
William B. English & J. Nellie Liang, Designing the Main Street Lending Program:
Challenges and Options (Hutchins Center for Fiscal and Monetary Policy Working
Paper No. 64, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/designing-themain-streetlending-program-challenges-andoptions.
59. Steve Cecchetti & Kim Schoenholtz, The Fed Goes to War: Part 3,
&
BANKING
(Apr.
12,
2020),
MONEY
https://www.moneyandbanking.com/commentary/2020/4/12/the-fed-goes-to-warpart-3 (arguing that the Fed should limit its involvement in the allocation of credit to
the private nonfinancial sector).
60. Barontini & Holden, supra note 18 (discussing the types of CDBC, such as
token-based and account-based).
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design, central banks would co-opt private sector institutions to
provide custodial or transfer services for users. Users may interact
with a commercially-provided user interface as a first port of call,
although central banks may be involved in maintaining the overall
architecture, such as expanding the range of accounts that may be
maintained by intermediaries at the central bank. 61 The benefit of this
would be a call to industry to innovate and provide the relevant
custodial and transfer services, and this could enroll competition into a
landscape of payment services, especially from the growing fintech
sector. Further, the issuance of a CBDC provides the central bank with
a new opportunity to engage with private sector providers to possibly
redesign operational and architectural aspects, and this could help
address in an ex ante manner potential inefficiencies that may arise
and ensure better coordination amongst different intermediaries. If a
token-based design for CBDC rollout facilitates new coordination
between central banks, payment services providers, innovators,
stakeholders, and the commercial sector, the opportunities for new
forms of co-governance 62 can arise, i.e., the public and private sector
participants are all incentivized and share in a common sense of
responsibility to maintain and govern the payment networks and
infrastructure. Such coordination can bring about more integrated and
effective designs for users than if designs were generated either from
the top-down or bottom-up. 63
Although there can be remittance and e-commerce benefits from
the issuance of a CBDC, whether account-based or token-based, it is
questionable whether the benefits of investing in and overhauling
operational and architectural aspects for either design (for central
banks, existing and would-be payment services intermediaries,
merchants, and possibly even retail users) would exceed the benefits
of pursuing greater efficiencies and coordination in existing systems.64
61. Alexander Kriwoluzky & Chi Hyun Kim, Public or Private? The Future of
Money (Pol’y Dept. for Economic, Scientific & Quality of Life Policies, DirectorateGeneral for Internal Policies for Econ. Committee, European Parliament, 2019),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/207653/13.%20PE%20642.356%20DIW%
20final%20publication-original.pdf.
62. FINCK, supra note 2, at 171–180.
63. Markus K. Brunnermeier, Harold James & Jean-Pierre Landau, The
Digitalization of Money (2019), http://www.nber.org/papers/w26300.
64. See Kriwoluzky & Kim, supra note 61.
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Interested central banks agree that the operationalizing of CBDC in
the mainstream economy involves significant architectural
transformations even with existing private sector support. First, the
“back end” of CBDC in terms of issuance, plugging into commercial
payment systems, as well as clearing and settlement, requires thinking
in terms of new infrastructure that may be needed, especially if such
infrastructure is to become decentralized to leverage upon blockchain
technology. 65 Next, the “front end” also requires thinking in terms of
user interface, ease and convenience of use, robust custodianship of
users’ CBDC and resilience from data loss and cyberhacking, and the
role of the central bank in such user relations. 66 Finally, the impact on
existing providers of electronic money, deposit accounts, and even
credit needs to be considered. 67
One question still needs to be answered by central bankers keen
on introducing CBDC into mainstream e-commerce and the retail
economy: Is there demand among existing consumer users for such a
currency format? Demand for CBDC such as in the euro area could
come from direct remittance needs, especially where individuals work
in a Member State not of their origin, as permitted under the European
freedom of movement rules, and remit money regularly back to
another Member State in the euro area. Disruptions for such
remittances may cause inconvenience and hardship, and individuals
could be incentivized to move away from their private sector current
account provider to a CBDC account for such transfers. 68 However, it
may be less likely that demand would come from the quarters of ecommerce in the European Single Market. The availability of the
CBDC may impose cost on merchants while not necessarily meeting
demand on users’ end. This is because CBDC is unable to meet users’
demand for credit-backed digital payment, and users may be better off
relying on private credit providers, such as credit cards which have
been vastly adapted for e-commerce. In light of extensive cost in
operational and architectural overhauling, demand patterns in the
65. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 42; BIS, supra note 9.
66. Id.
67. Id. In this respect the BIS (2020)’s foundational principle for introducing
CBDC is to do no harm while promoting co-existence with cash and innovation.
This may extend to preserving financial stability in connection with private sector
institutions and infrastructure, while not reducing the scope for innovation.
68. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 42.
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retail universe should be studied carefully in considering what policy
is best to combat inefficiencies and failures in payment systems. 69
II. THE PARTICULAR RELEVANCE OF CBDC TO THE DAPP ECONOMY
The mainstream introduction of the CBDC continues to entail
many questions. 70 In light of the challenges surrounding a general
rollout in the mainstream as canvassed above, this Article proposes
that an optimal approach could be a limited rollout of CBDC, targeted
at the dApp economy. 71 It may appear to be odd, in the face of
mainstream discussions regarding how CBDC could transform the
retail payment landscape, to turn our focus to the dApp economy.
However, this neglected space in conventional CBDC discussions is
arguably an optimal space for limited operationalization, as a rollout
may be more technologically compatible with the architecture of the
dApp economy and involves less of the operational challenges and
dilemmas faced by central banks in a general rollout scheme.
Further, the dApp economy is an economic space still struggling
to address its monetary order and is likely to benefit from an enabling
institution such as the CBDC. The institution of the CBDC can
provide a starting point for mainstream engagement with the dApp
economy, and pave the way for building out the crypto-economy as a
governed economic order. This vision is based on theoretical framing
in the concept of regulatory capitalism. 72 The mobilization of the
dApp economy can also be regarded as furthering the European Single
Digital Market Strategy 73 and can be supported by both policy and
law. The development of the dApp economy is of importance to the
69. Sheila Dow, Monetary Reform, Central Banks, and Digital Currencies, 48
INT’L J. POL. ECON. 153 (2019).
70. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 42; BIS, supra note 9.
71. See generally ANDREW ROMANS, MASTERS OF BLOCKCHAIN AND INITIAL
COIN OFFERINGS (2018).
72. See infra Part III, Section C.
73. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions on the Mid-Term Review on the Implementation of
the Digital Single Market Strategy: A Connected Digital Single Market for All
(SWD,
155
final,
2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-228-F1-ENMAIN-PART-1.PDF.
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European Union as many start-ups and innovative business ideas are
arising in this space. 74 The need to incorporate disruptive technologies
in the Digital Single Market initiative 75 has now been more explicitly
articulated in the new action plan for the capital markets union. 76 The
CBDC can be seen as part a facilitative mosaic for policy
developments.
This Article proposes a limited rollout of the CBDC in the dApp
economy to facilitate investment in dApp developments in particular.
Such a limited rollout would occur in an economic space that is
relatively “bounded,” as activities within this realm are currently not
too porous to mainstream commerce. The limited rollout initiative can
be contained and experimental, not significantly affecting or
disrupting the rest of the economy. Further, the limited rollout is
particularly beneficial for the crypto-economy and particularly
efficient for central banks. The dApp economy is still endeavoring to
develop private cryptocurrencies of sufficient monetary qualities, as
will be discussed below. The CBDC enjoys established monetary
qualities. Central banks would also benefit from discourse with private
sector developers in relation to the CBDC’s programmability and
robustness, lessons that can be relevant to further-reaching rollouts in
the future. A limited rollout of the CBDC can take place in the dApp
economy in order to observe uptake, demand, and operational issues.
A. The Evolution of the dApp Economy
The bitcoin blockchain was introduced in 2008 by a
pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto 77 in order to allow private payments
to be made securely and efficiently between individuals without
needing to involve existing intermediaries in the banking and financial
74. See, e.g., chainEurope, https://www.chaineurope.org/blockchain-startups/
(providing a directory of all European blockchain start-ups).
75. See McKinsey & Co., Shaping the Digital Transformation in Europe
(European Commission Working Paper: Economic Potential, 2020).
76. European Commission, Capital Markets Union 2020 Action Plan: A
Capital
Markets
Union
for
People
and
Businesses
(2020),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/growth-and-investment/capitalmarkets-union/capital-markets-union-2020-action-plan_en
[hereinafter
Capital
Markets Union Action Plan].
77. Nakamoto, supra note 32.
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system. The global banking crisis in 2007 to 2009 78 loomed large in
this context. Indeed, this development could be seen not only as a
technological innovation, but as a statement of distrust of the
prevailing financial institutions at that time. 79
Purporting to be a private currency, bitcoin is most famously
depicted in an exchange context, like in the following illustration.
Imagine that Alice can send Bob bitcoins in order to discharge a
payment obligation or to transfer value to Bob. How this is achieved is
that Alice initiates a transfer of bitcoin which she owns, manifested by
a string of digital data unique to the coins (which is known as the
public key to the coins), by using a private key to which she is
authorized (and which is mathematically related to the public key). As
the transaction is private in nature, the integrity of the system can only
be maintained if the double spend problem is prevented, i.e., that the
system prevents Alice from being able to send the same coins to
someone else again. The transaction is validated only by the
community within the system—known individually as nodes—whose
computers are connected to and have joined the bitcoin network.
From the early days of bitcoin, anyone can be a node, and
membership of the bitcoin blockchain is purportedly highly
democratized. Nodes are responsible for and compete to validate
transactions on the bitcoin blockchain, as validation is incentivized by
the reward of new bitcoins. Validation is carried out on the
blockchain, which is a network cumulative database that records all of
the transactions in bitcoin, of which each node would have an
identical copy. The distributed ledger is thus tamper-proof and failsafe at the same time as it is highly challenging for nodes to alter the
ledger unilaterally across all identical copies and there is no single
point of failure for the ledger.
Furthering our previous illustration, when Alice and Bob
complete their transfer and this transaction is “proposed” to nodes, the
78. See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A
REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS (2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/18_03_09_turner_review.pdf.
79. Dan Bousfield, Crypto-coin Hierarchies: Social Contestation in
Blockchain Networks, 19 GLOBAL NETWORKS 291 (2019); Moritz Hutten &
Matthias Thiemann, Moneys at the Margins: From Political Experiment to Cashless
Societies, in BITCOIN AND BEYOND: CRYPTOCURRENCIES, BLOCKCHAINS, AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn ed. 2018).
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transaction is broadcast with the public key of the bitcoin sent and a
digital signature. Nodes do not know Alice’s private key, but need to
verify if the digital signature is mathematically coherent with the
public key of the bitcoins sent. Nodes may verify in a decentralized
manner, and generally, several confirmations for one transaction
would increase the chances of its validity. The validation of
transactions is carried out by mining for “blocks,” which are clusters
of transactional data grouped together in order to constitute a valid
and immutable section of ledger data that would be accepted by all.
Miners compete to gather confirmed transactions within a time period,
say 10 minutes, and verify them by running “seed inputs” into the
hashing algorithm of the bitcoin blockchain until mathematical
coherence is achieved for all the transactions in the block. Miners
validate the integrity of transactions and assure that there is no double
spending according to previous validated records in blocks. The new
block is then hashed together with a “block header” that comprises the
block’s identification hash and the previous block’s hash, and is
timestamped in order to be added to the previous block. This mining
protocol is known as “proof-of-work,” which is derived from
established cryptographic methodology. Nodes have to confirm the
block before it is authoritatively added to the ledger, and the
successful miner receives a reward for mining, which started at 25
bitcoins per block and gradually decreasing in an algorithmically
determined manner. Decentralized competition provides the incentivebased mechanism for maintaining the distributed ledger, but the
competitive process for mining can result in waste of “work” by other
miners as well as perverse incentives in the competitive process such
as attacks on other miners or hijacking of others’ computational
power. 80
The bitcoin blockchain can be regarded as an efficient payment
mechanism as miners take on average 10 minutes to verify a
transaction, compared to days taken for international remittances
through banks. It may also be regarded as an alternative payment or
remittance system for unbanked peoples. 81 However, the cost80. Yue Wang et al., Pool Strategies Selection in PoW-Based Blockchain
Networks: Game-Theoretic Analysis, 7 IEEE ACCESS 8427 (2019).
81. Ignacio Mas & David Lee Kuo Chuen, Bitcoin-Like Protocols and
Innovations, in HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL CURRENCY: BITCOIN, INNOVATION,
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS, AND BIG DATA (David Lee Kuo Chuen ed. 2015).
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effective access to unbanked peoples potentially obscures a problem
in relation to the distribution of cost in maintaining the network.
Where payment systems are managed by centralized intermediaries,
they bear the cost of maintenance of the network by charging fees to
users, but users also get the benefit of institutional protections
regarding mistakes and failures. 82 In a distributed payment network,
the cost of maintaining the network is theoretically distributed across
all nodes. However, users are spared from bearing the cost as miners
are incentivized to undertake maintenance. Nevertheless, in order to
ensure that the blockchain is maintained at an optimal level, the cost
of validation cannot be too low, and this is evidenced by significant
amounts of energy spent 83 by miners’ computers solving the
mathematic hash puzzles in order to identify valid transactions. The
carbon footprint of such maintenance is arguably sub-optimal, and it
also results in the undermining of democratization in the blockchain as
mining pools or clusters become oligopolistic and powerful. 84
Bitcoin is still not widely adopted as an alternative payment
system to the real economy. Retailers who voluntarily accept
cryptocurrency as payment remain a minority, and may be
concentrated in markets where consumers are young and technologysavvy. 85 However, the invention of the bitcoin blockchain paved the
82. See generally Chiu, supra note 15.
83. Jean Bacon et al., Blockchain Demystified: A Technical and Legal
Introduction to Distributed and Centralized Ledgers, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1
(2018) (documenting that about 200kw of energy is consumed to validate each
transaction).
84. Francesca Musiani, Alexandre Mallard & Cécile Méadel, Governing What
Wasn’t Meant to Be Governed: A Controversy-Based Approach to the Study of
Bitcoin Governance, in BITCOIN AND BEYOND: CRYPTOCURRENCIES, BLOCKCHAINS,
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn ed. 2018); see also
Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn & Marcel Goguen, Blockchains, Trust And Action
Nets: Extending the Pathologies of Financial Globalization, 19 GLOBAL NETWORKS
308 (2019).
85. Nicole Jonker, What Drives the Adoption of Crypto-Payments by Online
Retailers?, 35 ELECTRONIC COMMERCE RESEARCH &APPLICATIONS 100848 (2019).
It remains to be seen if the adoption of mainstream payment services, such as Paypal
that offers cryptocurrency custody and credit cards that may offer bitcoin rewards,
may
galvanize
mainstream
adoption,
see
https://www.paypal.com/us/smarthelp/article/cryptocurrency-on-paypal-faqfaq4398; BlockFi’s credit card that promises cryptocurrency rewards. See BlockFi,
https://blockfi.com/bitcoin-card-crypto-rewards.
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way for the development of the Ethereum blockchain, which is now an
alternative economic space powered by its native cryptocurrency,
ether. Indeed, for holders of bitcoin as the leading cryptocurrency,
ether has become the most significant private cryptocurrency for the
alternative space of crypto-commerce. Hence, the bitcoin-ether pair of
exchange transactions has grown exponentially in value and volume. 86
The Ethereum blockchain went live in July 2015. The
achievement of the Ethereum blockchain is that it does not function
principally as a payment ledger, unlike the case of the original bitcoin
blockchain. Rather, it is an underlying infrastructure that supplies a
ledger and a protocol token, ether, that codes in basic laws of
functionalities that can then be used to execute more specific “smart
contracts” in application tokens.
The Ethereum blockchain provides an infrastructure that has a
relatively developed permissionless ledger 87 and protocol tokens 88 that
code in basic laws of functionalities. These tokens are used to build
more specific “smart contract” 89 code by dApp developers. The first
protocol token—the ERC-20—which has since been improved by the
Ethereum Foundation, is open source code that can be utilized by any
dApp developer to build specific transactional code that stores,
accesses and exchanges information, embeds entitlements, executes
exchanges, and functions as the currency of the transaction. 90 DApp
86. See,
e.g.,
Bitcoin
(BTC),
COINGECKO,
https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/bitcoin/eth (showing daily transactions
hovering over $500 million per day).
87. This means the network is open to participation by anyone.
88. These provide for the basic needs and functionalities for the blockchain
infrastructure as a whole, and are differentiated from application tokens more
specific to particular transactions. See Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchainbased Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the Democratization of Public
Capital Markets, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 463 (2019).
89. These refer to automated protocols for action execution. “Smart contracts”
are not the same as binding contracts in the legal sense. See generally Eliza Mik,
Smart Contracts: Terminology, Technical Limitations and Real World Complexity, 9
L. INNOVATION & TECH. 269 (2017).
90. Lawrence J. Trautman, Bitcoin, Virtual Currencies, and the Struggle of
Law and Regulation to Keep Peace, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 447 (2018); Dragan Zelic &
Nenad Baros, Cryptocurrency: General Challenges of Legal Regulation and the
Swiss Model of Regulation, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS OF 33RD INTERNATIONAL
SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT –
“MANAGERIAL ISSUES IN MODERN BUSINESS” 168 (Heidelberg: Springer, 2018);
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developers would build out and sell application tokens 91 to
participants who wish to join the dApp network and benefit from its
peer-to-peer marketplace. In such networks/marketplaces, participants
are free to transact with each other, powered by dApp tokens.
Transactional validity and record-keeping are based on the consensus
protocol for maintenance on the Ethereum blockchain, which is
decentralized. Such consensus protocol has evolved since the days of
the bitcoin blockchain. 92
The ether is the native token of the Ethereum blockchain, just as
the bitcoin is the native token of the bitcoin blockchain. However,
bitcoin’s functionalities are limited, and its script is narrowly
comprised of transfer and recording functions. Compare this with the
ERC-20 token, which is coded with more universal functional
qualities such as transferring within allowance limits, from specified
locations, approval protocols, and permitting access to data. These
universal qualities allow coders to build upon the token code with
more specific functions for particular commercial applications. 93
These applications or dApps can then offer new opportunities for
economic and commercial activity, such as the sale of CryptoKitties
over the internet. 94 Since 2015, business innovations have exploded in
Sandra Díaz-Santiago, Lil María Rodríguez-Henríquez & Debrup Chakraborty, A
Cryptographic Study of Tokenization Systems, 15 INT’L J. INFO. SECURITY 413
(2016) (arguing that multifunctional tokens are efficient).
91. These are usually sold as pre-development tokens. Such sales have raised
much controversy in many jurisdictions. Jurisdictions like the United States choose
to treat these as securities offers although there are distinctive characteristics
different with these sales, and other jurisdictions treat these as regulated or
otherwise on a case-by-case basis. See U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission,
Statement on Digital Asset Securities Issuance and Trading (Nov. 16, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/digital-asset-securites-issuuance-andtrading [hereinafter SEC Guidance 2018]; see also Financial Conduct Authority,
Guidance on Cryptoassets: Feedback and Final Guidance to CP 19/3 (July 2019),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps19-22.pdf; Alex Collomb, Primavera de
Fillippi & Klara Sok, Blockchain Technology and Financial Regulation: A RiskBased Approach to the Regulation of ICOs, 10 EUR. J. RISK REGULATION 263
(2019).
92. Nakamoto, supra note 32.
93. Rohr &Wright, supra note 88 (describing the difference between protocol
and application tokens).
94. CryptoKitties is a game available on the Ethereum blockchain. See
CryptoKitties, available at https://www.cryptokitties.co/.
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the dApp economy, built on this framework. The Ethereum
blockchain now hosts 90 percent of the dApp economy. 95
B. The Structures of the dApp Economy
In the dApp economy, economic agents can act as prosumers, 96
selling virtual goods and services, as well as consuming these
according to their needs. Economic relationships are no longer defined
as business (or commercial, corporatized entities) vis-á-vis consumers.
These economic relationships take place over blockchain-based
platforms, built upon algorithmic processes that support precisely
automated transactions (coded in digital “tokens”), and facilitate
record-keeping in a decentralized manner. 97 Unlike in the sharing
economy where online platforms are owned by corporations that
extract rent and capitalize on the network effects and data flowing
through their platforms, 98 blockchain-based platforms are usually
developed in an open source manner. 99 Scholars have recognized the
economic structuration offered by blockchains and the mode of
exchange offered by tokenization bring about a new form of
institutional technology for economic activity. 100
It is remarkable that the Ethereum blockchain has fostered a
thriving dApp economy despite the potential inconvenience and cost
of decentralized coordination in transaction validation and ledger
construction, and the constant need to rely on bottom-up processes to
95. Matthias Fromberger & Lars Haffke, ICO Market Report 2018/2019 –
Performance
Analysis
of
2018’s
Initial
Coin
Offerings
(2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3512125.
96. For example, economic agents can act on both the supply and demand
sides of the market.
97. Discussed shortly in relation to the mining protocols.
98. THE LAW OF ORGANISATIONS AND GOVERNANCE: RESPONDING TO
DISRUPTIVE BUSINESS MODELS AND DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION (Iris H-Y Chiu &
Roger M. Barker eds., 2020).
99. Primavera de Filippi, Translating Commons-Based Peer Production
Values into Metrics: Toward Commons-Based Cryptocurrencies, in HANDBOOK OF
DIGITAL CURRENCY: BITCOIN, INNOVATION, FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS, AND BIG
DATA (David Lee Kuo Chuen ed. 2015).
100. See generally CHRIS BERG, SINCLAIR DAVIDSON & JASON POTTS,
UNDERSTANDING THE BLOCKCHAIN ECONOMY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
INSTITUTIONAL CRYPTOECONOMICS (2019).
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foster institutional support for the crypto-economy generally. The
global value of the dApp economy is estimated to be at $14 billion.101
Further, transaction confirmations on the Ethereum blockchain
average between 15 seconds and 5 minutes, 102 and each block of the
ledger is mined at an average of under 20 seconds. 103 Other
innovations have arisen to compete with the Ethereum blockchain to
supply protocol infrastructure to facilitate dApp developments. These
include blockchains such as Tron, 104 with its native currency as Trx;
and Algorand, 105 with its native currency as the Algo. However,
empirical research finds that much of the traffic on blockchains other
than Ethereum are back and forth transfers and not genuinely
productive economic activity. 106
Although many dApps pertain to decentralized finance or
“DeFi,” 107 which attempts to allow peer-to-peer transactions in
finance to take place to avoid the rent extraction of financial
intermediaries in the conventional economy, 108 a large number of
dApps are commercial in nature, providing innovative virtual goods
and services amongst peers. For example, the dApp economy
facilitates the commoditization of new virtual goods such as the sale
of CryptoKitties 109 or a piece of virtual real estate in gaming worlds
such as Decentraland. 110
It is true that the sale of virtual art or
101. Bullman, Klemm & Pinna, supra note 10.
102. Eth Gas Station Blog, How long does an Ethereum transaction really
take (June 5, 2019), https://ethgasstation.info/blog/Ethereum-transaction-how-long/.
103. Etherscan,
Ethereum
Average
Block
Time
Chart,
https://etherscan.io/chart/blocktime (noting data from January 2020).
104. See, e.g., Tron, available at https://tron.network.
105. See, e.g., Algorand, available at https://www.algorand.com.
106. Daniel Perez, Jiahua Xu & Benjamin Livshits, Revisiting Transactional
Statistics of High-scalability Blockchains 27–29 (ACM Internet Measurement
Conference, 2020), https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.02693.
107. Sid Coelho-Prabhu, A Beginner’s Guide to Decentralized Finance
(DeFi), COINBASE (Jan. 6, 2020), https://blog.coinbase.com/a-beginners-guide-todecentralized-finance-defi-574c68ff43c4.
108. Asia Blockchain Review, Decentralized Finance: Defying the Global
BLOCKCHAIN
REV.
(Aug.
16,
2019),
Financial
System,
ASIA
https://www.asiablockchainreview.com/decentralized-finance-defying-the-globalfinancial-system/.
109. CryptoKitties, supra note 94.
110. See, e.g., Decentraland, available at https://decentraland.org.
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participation in online gaming are not new phenomena, however, the
blockchain-based infrastructure promotes economic relationships in a
peer-to-peer fashion that supports new forms of “prosumerism.”
Economic relationships can be made more multifaceted and complex
as users can assume roles on both the supply and demand sides of the
marketplace. For example, the marketplace for CryptoKitties can
accommodate many individual artists, but users can add further value
by breeding their kitties on the peer-to-peer gaming platform and
selling them.
Prosumerism is even more pronounced in a few other novel
business models. First, we turn to Iungo’s blockchain-based global
wireless facility. We often need to remain connected to the internet
while traveling, however, access to Wi-Fi may be patchy and mobile
data can be expensive, especially overseas. Iungo’s 111 business plan
utilizes a blockchain system to link up private users’ Wi-Fi networks,
so that at scale, a comprehensive network of Wi-Fi access can be
constructed across the globe, contributed by private users or peers.
Participants on Iungo’s platform can rent out their Wi-Fi access
facilities to ad hoc users on-the-go. Participation in this system is
tokenized by the ING token, which allows access to the global Wi-Fi
network and enables transfer of value. This system is built using the
Ethereum smart contract template and is not directly built upon the
Ethereum blockchain. This enables an “inner economy” powered by
token-holders’ supply and demand, which would not be affected
distortions caused by holders of ether. 112 Iungo’s peer-to-peer global
wireless internet access platform is novel and useful, and overcomes
the jurisdictional oligopolies for mobile internet access that has
sustained a market for expensive mobile data roaming charges. At
scale, such a model can potentially become a peer-to-peer constructed
global utility.
Second, Golem 113 is a peer-to-peer service marketplace that
brings together participants who have idle computing power and users
who wish to borrow others’ computing power to engage in computing
tasks that require significant capacity. Users who need access to
111. See, e.g., Iungo, available at https://iungo.network.
112. See, e.g., ING Tokens, IUNGO, https://iungo.network/ing-tokens/
(discussing ING tokens).
113. See, e.g., Golem, available at https://golem.network.
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significant computing power may include graphic artists or small
animation studios that require significant computing power to render
sophisticated graphics. Such tasks can usually be performed using
expensive graphics processors, or by borrowing a host of computers
joined together to supply the capacity needed on the user’s computer.
Golem provides such a peer-to-peer worldwide network for the supply
and demand side. Moreover, participation in this economy is again
tokenized, so that the GNT token provides access, and matching of
tasks with suitable nodes’ computing systems. Tasks are also subject
to automated “sharding,” i.e., to divide the task among a number of
nodes in order to maximize the capacity needed for the task and
ensure no single point of failure. In this manner, the task is efficiently
and effectively achieved and value creation is distributed among a
number of nodes, creating an egalitarian system.
It may be argued that Golem’s business model is not new, as there
are commercial server farms that rent out computational capacity to
others. Golem’s novelty lies in its scaling up to a global marketplace
by the standardization and commoditization of its arrangements via
tokenization, without necessarily an underlying relational fabric.
Next, we also observe that peer-to-peer cloud storage services
may take off at the scale of a global marketplace. Key players in this
field include Storj, 114 Maidsafe, 115 and Filecoin. 116 Peer-to-peer cloud
storage services allow individual users, i.e., peers to provide and rent
out spare hard disk capacity in order to store other users’ files. This
meets the need of cloud storage for users who are looking for off-site
storage of their files, currently provided by technological giants such
as Apple, Google, or Amazon. Peer-to-peer cloud storage services
would not be using the robust servers that technological corporate
giants have, but would be relying on the construction of a vast joint-up
space provided by individual contributors who join the network. Such
a business model potentially disrupts oligopolies in this space,
providing choice and price competition, and arguably a more secure
and private means of storage. Peer-to-peer cloud storage systems
enable protocols that “shard” files in order to distribute and replicate
copies of data across nodes. In this manner, nodes do not have access
114. See, e.g., Storj, available at https://storj.io.
115. See, e.g., Maidsafe, available at https://maidsafe.net.
116. See, e.g., Filecoin, available at https://filecoin.io.
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to entire pieces of information that may compromise privacy and the
downtime or failure of any one node is unlikely to compromise the
sending and retrieval of files. 117 Further, peers on the supply side are
paid for their services, which opens up a “sharing economy” for
economic mobilization of individuals. However, encryption is usually
the responsibility of users before they send files off to storage on the
relevant networks.
The above examples show novel ideas that can potentially scale
up to global marketplaces for services that may have been thought to
be most efficiently provided by corporatized institutions with
powerful servers. The dApp economy provides opportunities for new
economic mobilization 118 as individual users can now commoditize
their Wi-Fi facilities, idle computing power, or storage space. New
value chains can be created and captured by new economic actors. 119
Such global marketplaces are a further development from the “sharing
economy” phenomenon that has brought about new commoditization
and economic mobilization since the 1990s. 120
C. The Problems with the Monetary Order of the dApp Economy
The dApp economy is facilitated by private cryptocurrencies. The
first private cryptocurrency—bitcoin—has continued to survive its
notoriety, 121 volatility, 122 and express pronouncements by many that it
117. Seline Jung, Filecoin v. Sia, Storj & MaidSafe: The Crowded Push for
REPORT
(Aug.
3,
2017),
Decentralized
Storage,
TOKEN
https://medium.com/tokenreport/filecoin-v-sia-storj-maidsafe-the-crowded-push-fordecentralized-storage-7157eb5060c9.
118. Daivi Rodima-Taylor & William W. Grimes, Cryptocurrencies and
Digital Payment Rails in Networked Global Governance: Perspectives on Inclusion
and Innovation, in BITCOIN AND BEYOND: CRYPTOCURRENCIES, BLOCKCHAINS, AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn ed. 2018) (extending insights
beyond the cryptocurrency system).
119. See generally Alain Yee Loong Chong et al., Business on Chain: A
Comparative Case Study of Five Blockchain-Inspired Business Models, 20 J. ASS’N
FOR INFO. SYS.1308 (2019).
120. See generally ARUN SUNDARAJAN, THE SHARING ECONOMY: THE END OF
EMPLOYMENT AND THE RISE OF CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM (2016).
121. Henrik Karlstrøm, Do Libertarians Dream of Electric Coins? The
Material Embeddedness of Bitcoin, 15 Distinktion: Scandinavian J. SOC. THEORY
23, 24–36 (2014); Damodaran Appukuttan Nair, The Bitcoin Innovation, Crypto
Currencies and the Leviathan, 9 INNOVATION & DEV. 85, 86–103 (2019).
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does not function as good money, 123 in relation to its utility being a
unit of account, a store of value, and a medium of exchange. Although
bitcoin has become much more of a speculative asset 124 due to its
potential to achieve high prices, the most important private
cryptocurrency in the dApp economy is ether. Ether has not been
subject to the same levels of commoditized inflation as bitcoin, but it
also suffers from sub-optimal monetary qualities that may ultimately
affect its role as currency in the dApp economy. In this light, CBDC
may address the weaknesses of the monetary order of the dApp
economy and provide for the needs of its scaling up, appealing to the
possibility of mainstream mobilization.
The dApp economy has grown in spite of its monetary order of
unregulated crypto-currencies. However, its scalability and wide
accessibility may be hampered by a continuation of the existing state.
CBDC, if programmable into the blockchain protocols for the dApp
economy, can pave the way for the galvanization of commerce and
investment. DApp businesses can appeal more directly to mainstream
consumers used to fiat currencies, and possibly draw in greater
participation. Both businesses and consumers may also prefer the
greater familiarity and predictability of the digitalized fiat currency in
relation to it being a store of value, a unit of account, and a medium of
exchange. Fundraising by dApp developers conducted in CBDC can
also be more generally appealing to mainstream retail and institutional
investors.
Private cryptocurrencies are unlikely to meet the needs of scale,
certainty, and consumer protection in an expansion of the dApp
economy. This is because of (1) the lack of governance of the
commons of cryptocurrencies affects their key role as a medium of
exchange, and (2) the commoditization of cryptocurrencies adversely
affects their roles as supplying a unit of account and store of value,
which in turn adversely affects their role as a medium of exchange.

122. See generally Marc Gronwald, Is Bitcoin a Commodity? On Price Jumps,
Demand Shocks, and Certainty of Supply, 97 J. INT’L MONEY & FINANCE 86 (2019).
123. Emilios Avgouleas & William Blair, The Concept of Money in the 4th
Industrial Revolution – A Legal and Economic Analysis (Feb. 17, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3534701.
124. See generally Gronwald, supra note 122.
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Hence market-based solutions, such as stablecoins, are being
developed. However, as we shall discuss, there are functional and
regulatory risks abound for stablecoins.
1. Weaknesses of Private Cryptocurrencies as Money
Private cryptocurrencies’ weaknesses lie in their commoditization
as well as in how their payment functions are governed. As discussed
above, cryptocurrency blockchains are supported by protocols for
transaction validation and ledger construction. Although these
protocols are regarded as essential “governance” structures, many
blockchain networks do not offer much more by way of governance
institutions beyond those. For example if payment is effected in
private cryptocurrency where transactions have on-chain and off-chain
legs, 125 disputes that arise in the off-chain leg are not accommodated
within internal governance institutions in the blockchain-based
network, and users face the problem of the irreversibility of
payment. 126 Private law systems may meet users’ redress needs in a
blockchain-based cryptocurrency transaction but there would be
differences among different jurisdictions 127 where private law is
applied. Crucially, there could be disputes as to which body of private
law may apply based on the location of the transaction, which could
comprise a number of on-chain and off-chain legs.
Further the governance of blockchain networks is still being
developed in terms of clarifying users’ involvement and rights.128
125. Meaning that elements of the transaction cannot simply be performed and
completed on-chain, such as where verification of information pre-transaction is
required, or where ex-post delivery of goods or performance of services are required
physically.
126. See Jared Arcari, Decoding Smart Contracts: Technology, Legitimacy, &
Legislative Uniformity, 24 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FINANCIAL L. 363, 365 (2019).
127. See generally BLOCKCHAINS, SMART CONTRACTS, DECENTRALISED
AUTONOMOUS ORGANISATIONS AND THE Law (Daniel Kraus, Thierry Obrist &
Olivier Hari eds., 2019) (discussing extensively the differences in how private law is
applied in different jurisdictions for users’ redress needs in a blockchain-based
cryptocurrency transaction); see also THE LAW OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES (David Fox
& Sarah Green eds., 2019).
128. This is an emerging and fragmented landscape, as different dApp
communities may adopt different governance rules, and even democratic set-ups can
be susceptible to majoritarian control. See Phillip Hacker, Corporate Governance
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Blockchain networks foster clusters of power among code
developers 129 and miners 130 that can undermine the democratic ethos
of permission-less blockchains. If there is abusive or undesirable
behavior on a blockchain, for example in the face of a collusive “51%
attack” 131on the blockchain to seize power, the default mode of
governance is that selective clusters of users may pursue a hard fork,
so as to deviate from the chain and create a separate chain/community.
Forking can create uncertainties as to participants’ transactions and
assets and it is not necessarily the go-to solution for governing antisocial behavior. Blockchain networks require the development of
more sophisticated governance mechanisms and protocols, and
reliance on forking can be regarded as relatively “primitive.” The
underdevelopment of governance affects rights, obligations, and
responsibilities surrounding the core payment function on blockchain
networks.
Next, the commoditization of cryptocurrencies began with bitcoin.
It was not invented to serve a parallel crypto-economy, but was meant
to compete with fiat currency payment systems. Thus, private
exchanges arose all over the world 132 in order to offer exchange
between bitcoin and fiat currencies. The value for such exchange
became determined by social and community sentiment 133 and
for Complex Cryptocurrencies? A Framework for Stability and Decision Making in
Blockchain-Based Organizations, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN: TECHNO-SOCIAL
AND LEGAL CHALLENGES (Philipp Hacker et al. eds., 2019); Wessel Reijers et al.,
Now the Code Runs Itself: On-Chain and Off-Chain Governance of Blockchain
Technologies, TOPOI: 1–11 (2018).
129. Christian Catalini & Joshua S. Gans, Initial Coin Offerings and the Value
of Crypto Tokens (MIT Sloan Res. Paper No. 5347–18, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3137213.
130. Bronwyn E. Howell, Petrus H. Potgeiter & Bert M. Sadowski, OpenSource or Open-Slather? Governing Blockchain Applications as Common-Pool
Resources (TPRC47: The 47th Conference on Comm., Info., and Internet Pol’y,
2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3427166.
131. The 51% attack is a scenario where at least 51% of nodes on the
permissionless blockchain collude in order to bring about a seizure of power. See
Muhammad Saad et al., Exploring the Attack Surface of Blockchain: A Systematic
Overview 1 (2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.03487.pdf.
132. See, e.g., Coinbase, Bitfinex, and Binance.
133. See Nic Carter, Cryptoasset Valuation, in CRYPTOASSETS: LEGAL,
REGULATORY, AND MONETARY PERSPECTIVES (Chris Brummer ed. 2019); but see
Udo Milkau & Jürgen Bott, Digital Currencies and the Concept of Money as a

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2021

31

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2 [2021], Art. 12
2_Final_Updated_Master Copy_5.3.21_Chiu_Building Out the Crypto economy camera ready (Do Not Delete)6/23/2021 9:44 AM

284 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51
speculation, 134 as rudimentary institutions such as capped supply and
capped mining rewards do not provide a sufficient informational or
institutional environment to regulate prices efficiently. 135 Bitcoin
became highly commoditized and its price volatile, mimicking, in
several researchers’ findings, the prices of exhaustible commodities
such as oil. 136 The commoditization of bitcoin has invariably affected
other cryptocurrencies even if they have been developed for different
purposes. Even newer cryptocurrencies that are geared towards being
fundamentally functional, such as ether, have joined the same market
for interchangeability with bitcoin, altcoins, and fiat currencies.
The commoditization of the monetary order of the dApp economy
can adversely affect cryptocurrencies’ roles as units of account and
store of value, incentivizing even more speculative trading in them
and exchange activity. Volatile prices of cryptocurrencies means that
the “real” value of a virtual good or service in the dApp economy is
fluctuating constantly, rendering the unit of account function
meaningless. Both producers and consumers would constantly be
trading in and out of their holdings in order to manage value, resulting
in more financialized behavior than is necessary for sustaining
commerce. This environment can deter the scalability of the dApp
economy as mainstream users may not be willing or able to undertake
efforts in order to compensate for the poor monetary qualities of
cryptocurrency, and choose not to participate in the commercial
aspects of the dApp economy entirely. It may be counter-argued that
users can also be drawn to the state of the monetary order, as they can
both experience commercial transactions in crypto goods and services
while managing the investment aspect of the coins they hold.
However, going by F. A. Hayek’s assumption that economic agents
ultimately want price stability, 137 and the fact that central banks
Social Agreement, 12 J. PAYMENTS STRATEGY & SYS. 213 (2018) (noting the social
underpinnings do not confer on such currencies stability, and volatility can still
result in how the community perceives and uses the currency, e.g., for illicit
purposes).
134. See generally Gronwald, supra note 122.
135. See Nabilou, supra note 44.
136. See generally Gronwald, supra note 122.
137. F.A. HAYEK, DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES (Inst. of Economic Affairs,
London, 1976).
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around the world safeguard this as their main mandate, it is unlikely
that most users would enjoy the price volatility of their coins meant
for transactional purposes, 138 even if a number of them would also
desire price volatility for investment arbitrage.
2. Stablecoins as Market-based Response
Bottom-up solutions have been developed to satisfy this
impossible coincidence of wants—both price stability for crypto
commerce and price volatility for crypto investment. These are in the
form of stablecoins. Stablecoins are designed to maintain their market
values within certain parameters, therefore providing for their price
stability.
The ECB 139 has surveyed two key stablecoin techniques,
including: (1) maintaining stable values as pegged to or based on
collateral, such as certain fiat currencies or even a basket of fiat or
crypto-currencies; and (2) maintaining stability by automated
protocols that respond to excess demand or supply of coins, therefore
performing central-bank like monetary functions. Protocols could be
coded to trigger airdrop when supply needs to be boosted. If
contraction of supply is desirable, protocols can be coded to
incentivize users to “lock” or sell coins for a fee in order to build up
“reserves,” and reserves can be used to purchase coins on the market
for lock-up or burning in order to reduce the monetary supply. 140
The first technique would give rise to stablecoins as hedging
instruments for cryptocurrency users. However, stablecoins may not
be well integrated as programmable currency in the blockchain
protocol. The second technique requires more complex programming
for the native currency of the blockchain. 141 Empirical research has
138. Avgouleas & Blair, supra note 123.
139. Bullman, Klemm & Pinna, supra note 10.
140. This is the model for Basis, a stablecoin, but Basis has since shut down in
December 2018. See Brady Dale, Basis Stablecoin Confirms Shutdown, Blaming
COINDESK
(Dec.
13,
2018),
‘Regulatory
Constraints,’
https://www.coindesk.com/basis-stablecoin-confirms-shutdown-blaming-regulatoryconstraints.
141. Ingolf Gunnar Anton Pernice et al., Monetary Stabilisation in
Cryptocurrencies - Design Approaches and Open Questions (Crypto Valley
Conference
on
Blockchain
Technology,
IEEE,
2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3398372.
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found the second technique to be less than successful in achieving
stability in value. 142 For example, Ampleforth 143 is an algorithmicallymanaged stablecoin whose values are adjusted by demand-side
information that is constantly updated. However, although it purports
to be self-adjusting and uncorrelated with bitcoin and ether’s market
volatility, its own price has fluctuated in a similar pattern to the more
volatile cryptocurrencies. Further, Yam—a “decentralized finance”
experiment attempting to offer an algorithmic stability mechanism for
its coin against the U.S. dollar, was initially greeted in the cryptoeconomy with much hope. However, a serious bug was ultimately
discovered shortly after a successful round of token offering, leading
to the entire project being written off. 144
Stablecoins based on collateralization are much more popular, but
their relationships with fiat currencies and other financial assets means
that they would not be left in a regulatory lacuna. 145 Such regulatory
developments have arguably been triggered by the proposed
introduction of Libra—which has now been rebranded as Diem—by a
consortium led by Facebook.
Libra is to be issued by the Libra Association based in Geneva,
Switzerland, of which Facebook is a founding member. 146 The
Association’s initial plan was to develop a global payments
blockchain that facilitates payment in a private stablecoin. The
142. There is evidence of increasing refinement and innovation. See David
Cerezo Sánchez, Truthful and Faithful Monetary Policy for a Stablecoin Conducted
by a Decentralised, Encrypted Artificial Intelligence (Sept. 2019),
https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.07445.
143. See, e.g., Ampleforth, available at https://www.ampleforth.org.
144. Jamie Redman, Defi Implosion: YAM Token Market Cap Plummets to
Near Zero Founder After Claims He ‘Failed,’ BITCOIN.COM (Aug. 13, 2020),
https://news.bitcoin.com/defi-yam-token-market-plummets-near-zero-founderfailed/.
145. Financial Stability Board, Addressing the Regulatory, Supervisory and
Oversight Challenges Raised by “Global Stablecoin” Arrangements (Apr. 14,
2020), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P140420-1.pdf.
146. Libra was recently renamed as “Diem.” See The Diem Association,
Announcing the name Diem. Executive leadership in place in preparation for
launch, DIEM (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.diem.com/en-us/updates/diemassociation/; see also Nikhilesh De, Libra Rebrands to ‘Diem’ in Anticipation of
2021 Launch, COINDESK (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/libra-diemrebrand. This Article uses the terms Libra and Diem interchangeably.
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stablecoin would be issued in return for fiat currency that is held in a
reserve backed by low-risk assets such as deposits and government
securities in order to ensure each Libra coin would be fully backed
and stable in value. 147 The reserve would be managed by asset
managers and custodians subject to the Association’s oversight.
Transactions in Libra would be validated by the founding members
who are the validator nodes on the blockchain. Despite this set-up
being a blockchain, it would be centrally managed by the Association,
which extracts rent from users on an ongoing basis. This would not be
fully distributed unlike in other private cryptocurrency blockchains.
The attraction for the dApp economy would be if Libra could be a
stablecoin programmable with existing blockchain protocol.
Nevertheless, although Libra is written as open source code and dApp
developers are welcome to adopt it, they are likely to converge upon
the programming language for Ethereum as the network effects of the
Ethereum blockchain merely reinforce these. Libra is also more likely
regarded as shackled to the old corporate economy.
As Facebook is in a position to galvanize 2 billion users to
participate in Libra, the potential scalability has drawn regulators’
attention to it. Financial Stability Board Chair Randall Quarles and
Bank of England Governor Mark Carney have warned that the use of
Libra could generate systemic risk, 148 a warning that has not been
aimed at the crypto-economy so far. 149 Researchers have modeled the
potential for stablecoins like Libra to attract substantial inflows of
retail funds and warn of severe risks to bank funding as well as
investor protection and financial stability risks if the management of
stablecoins should experience impaired balance sheets or a liquidity

147. See The Diem Association, Economics and the Reserve, DIEM,
https://libra.org/en-US/about-currency-reserve/#the_reserve (noting the recent name
change and that the content of the Libra White Paper v2.0, which was published in
April 2020, may differ based on regulatory approvals or other considerations, and
may evolve over time).
148. Kiran Stacey & Caroline Binham, Global regulators deal blow to
Facebook’s Libra currency plan, FINANCIAL TIMES (June 25, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/0c1f3832-96b1-11e9-9573-ee5cbb98ed36.
149. Mark Carney, Letter as Chair of the Financial Stability Board to the G20
Finance Ministers and Central Bankers (Mar. 13, 2018), http://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/P180318.pdf.
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run. 150 Coming under enormous regulatory pressure, Facebook has
tweaked its Libra business model. 151 It now proposes to issue Diem
tokens against major fiat currencies to be used in a permissioned
payment system across the globe. This may mean that the payment
system would function more like an international remittance system
rivaling other social media-based payment systems, such as the
Chinese WePay. This would make the Diem system more removed
from being likely to interface with the dApp economy. 152 The
Financial Stability Board 153 (“FSB”) has also now explicitly
encouraged financial regulators all over the world to subject
stablecoins to regulation, in particular those with large market impact,
whether by categorizing within existing financial regimes or
introducing law reform.
The European Commission has now issued a proposal 154 to
regulate “asset-referenced” stablecoins, treating them as a suis generis
type of financial product. Their offers would be subject to
authorization and mandatory disclosure, and issuers are subject to
prudential requirements and regulatory standards in terms of how
reserves are managed, audited, disclosed, and how holders’ rights are
defined and protected. Collateralized stablecoins in the market would
need to prepare for regulatory compliance and it is uncertain if their
150. Mitsutoshi Adachi et al., A Regulatory and Financial Stability
Perspective on Global Stablecoins, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (May 5, 2020),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/financial-stability/macroprudentialbulletin/html/ecb.mpbu202005_1~3e9ac10eb1.en.html#toc1.
151. Hannah Murphy & Izabella Kaminska, Facebook’s Libra overhauls core
parts of its digital currency vision, FINANCIAL TIMES (Apr. 16, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/23a33fcb-1342-4a18-be39-504e8507f752.
152. Nick Statt, Facebook is shifting its Libra cryptocurrency plans after
(Mar.
3,
2020),
intense
regulatory
pressure,
VERGE
https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/3/21163658/facebook-libra-cryptocurrencytoken-ditching-plans-calibra-wallet-delay.
153. Financial Stability Board, Regulatory, Supervisory and Oversight
Challenges Raised by “Global Stablecoin” Arrangements (Oct. 13, 2020),
https://www.fsb.org/2020/10/regulation-supervision-and-oversight-of-globalstablecoin-arrangements/.
154. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on Markets in Crypto-Assets, and Amending
Directive
(EU)
2019/1937
(Sept.
2020),
https://ec.europa.eu/finance/docs/law/200924-crypto-assets-proposal_en.pdf
[hereinafter European Commission Proposal 2020].
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business models would be radically affected, and whether users and
issuers would find access to collateralized stablecoins too costly.
The Commission’s proposal purports to capture stablecoins
collateralized against fiat currencies, commodities, and even cryptoassets. Popular stablecoins such as Tether, dai, and Diem would be
affected. To date, the stablecoin with the greatest market
capitalization 155 is Tether collateralized against U.S. dollar and euro
reserves, and also the Chinese yuan. 156 Tether Limited, its issuer
would need to be authorized and be subject to approval based on a
number of conditions, in order to make its stablecoin available to
purchasers from the European Union. These conditions include inter
alia, regulatory vetting of enterprise governance, repute of
management and controllers, and continuing regulatory requirements
in relation to minimum capitalization of at least €2 million or 2
percent of its reserves, as well as continuing organizational, business
continuity, holder protection, audit, and complaint handling
regulations.
Holders of tether treat it largely as an investment product to hedge
against bitcoin, and perhaps they may welcome the regulatory
standards. However, it is queried if issuers can charge an “investment
management” cost, a revenue model that does not currently exist.
Tether Limited currently benefits from trades in tether pairs such as on
its allegedly related Bitfinex crypto-exchange. 157 Further, regulating
asset-referenced stablecoins would adversely affect their potential to
become a means of payment, as e-money tokens are regulated
differently and subject to either bank or electronic money issuer
regulation in the European Union. 158 Such a regulatory design is
arguably aimed at corporatized issuers, like the Diem Association, 159
and based excessively on assumptions regarding the dominance of
activities of investment management.
155. See
Tether,
COINMARKETCAP,
https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/tether/ (displaying data as of Sept. 27, 2020).
156. See, e.g., Tether, available at https://tether.to.
157. Michael Kapilkov, Bitfinex Is Constantly Printing More Tether, None of
(May 27, 2020),
It Has Ever Been Burned, COINTELEGRAPH
https://cointelegraph.com/news/bitfinex-is-constantly-printing-more-tether-none-ofit-has-ever-been-burned.
158. European Commission Proposal 2020, supra note 154.
159. See The Diem Association, supra note 147.
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The Commission’s proposal would pose challenges for dai—a
stablecoin issued by MakerDAO. Users are able to create dai by
locking up an amount of ether in a smart contract that creates a vault.
Dai is a collateralized stablecoin against ether and other Ethereumbased tokens, soft-pegged against the U.S. dollar. 160 In order to
compensate for the volatility of ether, users need to adjust their levels
of collateralization based on the ether-USD volatility. Fluctuations in
ether would mean the need to over-collateralize in order to maintain
the holdings of dai or else an automated protocol can be triggered to
liquidate the collateral in the vault. It has been reported that the
collateralization ratio can be as high as 300 percent. 161 However, it
seems that MakerDAO development of dai is not only as a hedging
instrument against ether volatility, and its business model seems
dissimilar from Tether’s which advances trading in pairs and Tether’s
hedging function. MakerDAO encourages users of dai not to trade in
and out of dai for speculation, but to hold dai, by saving in an app
with a savings rate. 162 Further, automated protocols stabilize dai
against speculation by incentivizing nodes to make markets in dai to
moderate levels of demand. 163 As a whole, these aspects advance the
purposes of dai becoming a trust-building and self-sustaining private
cryptocurrency. Although its collateralization and stabilization
protocols are now crucial to its credibility, it can be argued that dai’s
stability mechanisms premised upon collateralization may be a
transition phase. It is necessary now for dai to be transformed from
ether, the productive cryptocurrency of the Ethereum blockchain.
However, if sufficient dai enter into circulation so that the value of dai
may be maintained by protocols regarding demand and circulation,
then the value of collateralization may become moot. This would be
similar to the uncoupling of established fiat currencies from being
backed by gold. In sum, dai’s ultimate development could lie in its

160. The Maker Protocol: MakerDAO’s Multi-Collateral Dai (MCD) System,
MAKER FOUNDATION, https://makerdao.com/en/whitepaper#use-of-the-mkr-tokenin-maker-governance.
161. Amani Moin, Emin Gün Sirer, & Kevin Sekniqi, A Classification
Framework for Stablecoin Designs (Cornell U. & AVA Labs, 2019),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1910.10098.pdf.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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adoption as the trusted stable private cryptocurrency on the Ethereum
blockchain.
In regulating dai narrowly as a financial asset focused on reserve
and investment management, and subject to investors’ rights of
valuation and redemption, regulators are likely to force compliance
that may undermine the multifaceted features of the stablecoin, such
as the payment and savings aspects. The European Union’s regulatory
proposal seems likely to hamper the crypto-economy’s bottom-up
efforts in developing its monetary order. Further, MakerDAO would
also face difficulties in securing authorization under the proposal as it
may not be a legal organizational form recognized in any Member
State. Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (“DAOs”) 164 purport
to be hierarchically flat, governed by automated protocols and do not
subscribe to a corporate structure. In this manner, the imposition of
“management-like” duties upon “responsible persons” in the DAO
may be ill-fitting.
The regulatory risk for stablecoins pose challenges for their
seamless adoption in the monetary order of the crypto-economy,
although well-intentioned investor protection objectives underpin their
regulation. The FSB’s announcement and the European Union’s
regulatory proposal show that regulatory attention is very much
focused on the stablecoin as a financial product and emphasis is
placed on the familiar financial risks that entail from the selling,
conduct of business, risk management, and governance aspects
relating to the stablecoin. Hence, the stablecoin is not looked at in
terms of its functions in the dApp economy. This narrow approach to
stablecoins would unlikely resolve the needs of the dApp economy in
terms of its monetary order. 165
In light of the regulatory risks that surround private stablecoins, it
may be argued that developing a digitally programmable fiat currency
for the dApp economy may be the preferred way forward. In the
United States, two registered money service businesses Circle and
Coinbase, which is also a cryptocurrency exchange, have launched a
164. Christopher Jentzsch, The History of the DAO and Lessons Learned,
BLOG (Aug. 24, 2016), https://blog.slock.it/the-history-of-the-dao-andlessons-learned-d06740f8cfa5; see also Ori Oren, ICO’s, DAO’S, and the SEC: A
Partnership Solution, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 617, 619 (2018).
165. See generally Iris H-Y Chiu, Pathways to European Policy and
Regulation in the Crypto-economy, 10 EUR. J. RISK & REG. 738 (2019).
SLOCK.IT
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“USD Coin,” i.e., a digital version of the U,S. dollar to be fully
programmable in blockchain-based applications. 166 This could
arguably be the ultimate stablecoin for the U.S. market or even the
global market, given the reserve currency status of the U.S. dollar.
However, such a digital currency is likely the equivalent of electronic
money in the European Union, 167 and the soundness of the USD Coin
depends on the solvency of the issuer as it is a claim upon the issuer.
CBDC would be superior in quality to privately issued electronic fiat
money.
It can be queried whether algorithmically-managed stablecoins
may be the way forward for the dApp economy to implement a private
means of cryptocurrency payment that remains unregulated but is able
to meet users’ needs in terms of monetary qualities. Under the E.U.
Commission’s proposal, algorithmically-managed stablecoins would
unlikely fall within the stringent regulatory regime for assetreferenced stablecoins, but their offers may need to comply with offer
regulation which demands mandatory disclosure in a white paper.
Such regulation would however not be a regime of continuous
investment management regulation, like that imposed on assetreferenced stablecoin issuers. This Article is sceptical that
algorithmically-managed stablecoins may be able to meet users’
needs’. In order to meet users’ needs of monetary stability, even if it is
relative and not absolute stability, we may turn to major global
currencies to discern the underpinnings for their relative stability.168
Major global currencies are managed by central banks, many of which
are committed to price stability, even if their mandates can be
influenced by policy needs from time to time. 169 This is largely due to
166. See, e.g., Circle, available at https://www.circle.com/en/#.
167. Electronic Money Directive, Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the
internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU
and Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC
[hereinafter E.U. Electronic Money Directive].
168. Mark Sobel, Major foreign exchange pairs hold steady, OFFICIAL
MONETARY & FINANCIAL INST. FORUM (OMFIF) (May 29, 2020),
https://www.omfif.org/2020/05/major-foreign-exchange-pairs-hold-steady/.
169. See generally Jeffrey A. Frieden, Real Sources of European Currency
Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration, 56 INT’L
ORGANISATION 831 (2002).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol51/iss2/12

40

Chiu: Central Bank Digital Currency for the Crypto-economy: An Experi-m
2_Final_Updated_Master Copy_5.3.21_Chiu_Building Out the Crypto economy camera ready (Do Not Delete)6/23/2021 9:44 AM

2021] CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY FOR THE CRYPTO-ECONOMY 293
the underpinnings of free and open trading, usually in large, deep, and
liquid markets. Although currency trading has been dogged by
manipulation scandals, 170 swift enforcement, 171 and the forces of
broad and liquid markets, trading provides balance to the price
formation of major global currencies. A key risk in the price formation
for algorithmically-managed cryptocurrency is whether and how the
underpinnings for stability management may be manipulated. In the
case of Ampleforth, for example, the purported relative stability of the
coin is maintained by reflecting demand side information. It is
questioned whether demand side information can be manipulated,
especially by large holders, whose incentives in using these tokens, for
example as swap assets, could affect their demand behavior. Market
manipulation, even in large and deep securities markets, is often
regulated by prohibitive standards and regulatory enforcement. 172 If
algorithmically-managed cryptocurrencies are neither supported by
large and liquid trading markets or the regulation of market
manipulation, their credibility may not be scalable. However, it is a
chicken-and-egg problem for such cryptocurrencies, as large and
liquid trading markets for them are generally developed after they are
able to achieve scalability and widespread adoption.
Although the European Union’s proposal to regulate assetreferenced cryptoassets would not apply to algorithmically-managed
stablecoins, hence sparing them of the onerous obligations akin to
investment management regulation, all cryptoassets offered in the
European Union would be subject to public offer and mandatory
disclosure regulation. 173 In particular, mandatory disclosure is
required of the technological protocols and how they work, in relation
170. Sebastian Chrispin, Forex scandal: How to rig the market, BBCNEWS
(May 20, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-26526905.
171. Daniel Schäfer, Caroline Binham & Kara Scannell, Regulators slap
$4.3bn fines on six banks in global forex probe, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014),
https://www.ft.com/content/aa812316-69be-11e4-9f65-00144feabdc0.
172. See, e.g., Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and
repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and
Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, art. 12
(focusing on strict liability for effects caused by abnormal trading practices)
[hereinafter E.U. Market Abuse Regulation 2014]; see also Winterflood
Securities Ltd & Ors v The Financial Services Authority [2010] EWCA Civ 423.
173. See infa Part III, Section C, subd. (2).
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to framing the expectations and rights of users. It is queried whether
algorithmically-managed stablecoins may be susceptible to complex
programming that needs to be adjusted during development, and are
less susceptible to either comprehensive disclosure (which jeopardizes
regulatory compliance with the cryptoasset offer regulations) or may
attract investors’ ex post litigation for deviations, even if made with
good intentions as part of code development. The European Union’s
fitting of algorithmically-managed stablecoins within a general
cryptoasset definition that caters more for utility-type tokens poses
regulatory hazards for these coins. At this juncture, this Article doubts
that algorithmically-managed stablecoins would provide the ultimate
privately-driven solution to the dApp economy’s monetary order.
In this light, CBDC can be considered in terms of its enabling
effect in the dApp economy, in relation to providing dApp developers
and users with a choice that mitigates their financial risk and is
supportive of the dApp economy’s development. This would be
premised upon partnership between the public and private sector, such
as with Ethereum developers, in developing CBDC’s
programmability.
Some dApp developers may, however, hold the view that the
dApp economy should not be integrated with the mainstream
economy and should be “sovereign resistant.” 174 DApp developers
may prefer an “anarcho-capitalist ethos” 175 that allows them to carve
out an economic space unshackled from conventional economic, legal,
political, and social institutions. 176 In this manner, the issuance of a
CBDC programmable for the dApp economy may be unwelcome as
the dApp economy may be perceived to be a space described by
Schrepel 177 as deliberately designed to facilitate choice for those who
wish not to be subject to the rule of law. However, this may not be a
universal view held in all quarters. First, in a survey of token offerings
made by dApp developers, it mentions that developers could offer a

174. Brady Dale, Libra Scales Back Global Currency Ambitions in Concession
to Regulators, COINDESK (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/libra-scalesback-global-currency-ambitions-in-concession-to-regulators.
175. See generally Flood & Robb, supra note 5.
176. See generally Schrepel, supra note 4.
177. Id.
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choice of acceptance in fiat or cryptocurrency. 178 This demonstrates
that some developers would like to appeal more broadly to
investors. 179 Second, the popularity of collateralized stablecoins
against fiat currencies reflects the underlying need of dApp developers
to mitigate cryptocurrency volatility and the adverse impact on them.
The reliance on leading fiat currencies reflects the inherent
unsustainability in simple resistance against conventional institutions.
In putting to the test the win-win proposal for dApp developers and
central banks keen on implementing a CBDC, this Article proposes
that a limited rollout to enable CBDC to support investment in the
dApp economy is an appropriate first step. We would be able to
observe at least the following effects for further development: (1) the
effects of CBDC upon payment competition in the dApp economy; (2)
mainstream demand for investment and consumption in the dApp
economy; (3) the integration of the crypto-economy into the
mainstream; and (4) the levels of growth in dApp enterprises and of
what types.
The market-based governance of the dApp economy is unlikely to
foster a solution to its monetary order that would appeal broadly to
social trust. Social trust is more effectively supported by institutional
qualities beyond merely market-based governance. We argue that
CBDC mediates the institutional connection to the dApp economy that
is needed for its further development and mobilization. The trajectory
towards growth, development, and mobilization in the dApp economy
is an inevitable one as more prosumers are keen to join the space. In
this manner, it would be increasingly untenable for this space to be
fringe and unregulated, institutionally disembodied or incompatible. If
a household experiments with culinary exploits and treats its private
members and neighbors, it may be ad hoc and unregulated. But where
it gains popularity and scale, and its culinary exploits are accessed by
more and on a regular basis, it would be untenable not to consider if it
should be recognized as a restaurant, therefore needing to conduct
itself with a measure of institutionally expected standards of safety
and hygiene. In an analogous manner, the fringe and experimental
178. Sabrina Howell, Marina Niesser & David Yermack, Initial Coin
Offerings: Financing Growth With Cryptocurrency Token Sales, NAT’L BUREAU OF
ECON. RES. (Sept. 2019), http://www.nber.org/papers/w24774.
179. Id.
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nature of the dApp economy has progressed to a point of significant
growth and development, and maturation would likely be facilitated
by reconciling with institutional framing. We argue that issuing
CBDC for the specific purpose of investment in the dApp economy is
a crucial starting point. By situating the policy for CBDC within a
broader theoretical framework of regulatory capitalism, it explains the
need for any capitalist order that is well-functioning to be governed
appropriately.
D. CBDCs as Lynchpin for the Development of the DApp Economy:
The Paradigm of Regulatory Capitalism
The broader theoretical framework for the role of CBDCs is
regulatory capitalism, which explains why apparently free-market or
private sector-led activity is inextricably connected with and
underpinned by public sector institutions, notably institutions of law
and regulation. The scaling up, mobilization, and galvanization of the
dApp economy needs social acceptance and penetration into the
mainstream. Public sector institutions, such as the legal tender status
of the CBDC, are able to provide facilitative support and regulative
underpinnings that are essential for social trust.
In the history of Anglo-American capitalism, the promotion of
free and liberal markets is seen to be necessary for individual
freedoms and success, but free markets have been underpinned by
regulatory capitalism. “Regulatory capitalism” is defined as a
symbiotic division of “labor” between the state and the private sector
where the role of the state in economic policy is that of “steering”
while the private sector is responsible for “rowing.” 180 Rowing depicts
the work of actual service provision and technological innovation that
is carried out by the private sector as commercial and business
activity, while steering refers to setting policy in order to influence,
govern, or incentivize behavior or output in relation to rowing. 181 The
objectives of regulation are to steer away from the problems that
unbridled markets give rise to, such as market failures and providing
collective goods. Such intervention nevertheless supports markets so
180. See David Levi-Faur, The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism,
598 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
12 (2005); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REGULATORY CAPITALISM (2008).
181. See generally BRAITHWAITE, supra note 180.
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that they can work optimally. Regulatory capitalism arguably provides
a theoretical underpinning for the building of the European Single
Market too, opined by some as a neo-liberal project but crucially
embedding the unique ordoliberal ethos 182 that places the flourishing
of innovative economic activity within social order and well-being.
In this manner, policy and design of regulation for the dApp
economy is targeted at integrating such economic developments
within an institutional fabric. This does not mean that a “coherentist”
approach 183 is taken in reconciling, interpreting or extending existing
bodies of law and regulation to the dApp economy however ill-fitting,
such an approach being counterproductive to the building up of this
economic sphere and facilitating its orderly development. The
recognition that policy is needed for steering the rowing activities of
the dApp economy means that we can consider its needs as the
starting point for the establishment of appropriate legal institutional
architecture. This starting point in no way ensures that legal or
regulatory outcomes are final and not experimental. As Michèle Finck
argues, 184 legal innovation is often necessary to accompany significant
technological innovation and disruption.
It is acknowledged, however, that regulators often approach an
innovation with their “baggage” of assumptions that have been
applied to existing industry business models, processes, or products.
This may be due to an unchanging mandate or scope of jurisdiction
conferred upon regulators, compelling regulators to fit innovations
within their ontologies, rather than to determine if sufficient novelty
has developed to warrant different taxonomies and approaches. 185 It is
arguable that the spirit of regulatory capitalism is not shackled to such
incremental assumptions. As Cristie Ford argues, innovation can be
“sedimentary” or “seismic,” referring to the scale of different, impact
of change, and structural effects that types of innovation can bring
182. See generally ORDOLIBERALISM, LAW AND THE RULE OF ECONOMICS
(Josef Hien & Christian Joerges eds., 2017) (discussing ordoliberal ethos).
183. See ROGER BROWNSWORD, LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY 191–196
(2019) (referring to a legal mindset that seeks to first fit new phenomena within the
frameworks of existing legal ontologies).
184. See generally Michèle Finck, Blockchains: Regulating the Unknown, 19
GERMAN L.J. 665 (2018).
185. See Syren Johnstone, Taxonomies of Digital Assets: Recursive or
Progressive, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L & POL’Y 1 (2019).
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about for the economy and society. 186 Regulators need to be able to
respond to either and a “coherentist” approach is not assumed in
furthering regulatory capitalism.
Other scholars argue that innovation often entails “boundary”
challenges for law and regulation as unregulated entities perform the
equivalent of regulated activities or regulated entities undertake new
and unregulated activities, raising questions for an appropriate
institutional response. 187 In the dApp economy, there is also potential
“smashing” of boundaries as unregulated entities undertake new and
innovative unregulated activities which nevertheless attract concerns
in relation to how the commons of such activities need to be
governed. 188 Hence, the theoretical location of the dApp economy in
regulatory capitalism does not mean the stultification of innovation by
the extension of stale laws or regulations to novel phenomena. Rather,
an opportunity arises for new negotiation of the social contract
regarding the integration of this space into the social and economic
fabric.
Next, we turn to the mechanics of introducing the CBDC in the
dApp economy using the central bank digital euro as a proposed
experiment in the European Single Market.
III. CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL EURO AS AN EXPERIMENT FOR LIMITED
ROLLOUT IN THE DAPP ECONOMY OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET
The most significant economic activity in the dApp economy is
fundraising for dApp development projects, known as “initial coin
offerings” (“ICOs”). Developers of a dApp business project typically
offer tokens in return for cryptocurrency from supporters. These are
the application tokens envisaged to be used on the dApp when the
186. See CRISTIE FORD, INNOVATION AND THE STATE: FINANCE, REGULATION,
166–236 (2017).
187. See, e.g., Charles A. E. Goodhart & Rosa M. Lastra, Border Problems, 13
J. INT’L ECON. L. 705 (2010).
188. A commons is relevant for blockchain-based networks as there may be
collective goods apart from the protocols relating to transaction validation and
ledger construction that require addressing, such as dispute resolution. See Sinclair
Davidson, Primavera De Fillippi & Jason Potts, Blockchain and the Economic
Institutions of Capitalism, 14 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 639 (2018). See generally
ELINOR OSTRÖM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
AND JUSTICE
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project finally goes live. Token offerings are “pre-incorporation” in
nature, meaning that they are held ahead of any business development.
The fundraising is premised upon a business idea and developers’
plans as to how the idea should be technologically executed. This is a
novel point in time for business fundraising, as securities fundraising
is usually premised upon a degree of maturity of the company and
even venture-capitalists that fund start-up stages are facing usually an
already-incorporated company with perhaps some initial operations. 189
Tokens confer a variety of consideration in return for supporters’
funds. For example, utility tokens confer on subscribers a future right
to use or enjoy certain services, 190 and resemble a pre-sale of yet-toexist rights or services. However, these come in a different variety in
terms of whether they may be user-based, or include other
participation rights. 191 “Fun” tokens may confer a benefit to the
community at large or to another without consideration. 192 Investment
tokens confer on subscribers a right to participate in a form of
investment and risk being classified as falling foul of existing
financial markets or securities regulation. 193
The pre-sale of tokens comes close to resembling established
practices for corporate fundraising, which is regulated under many
jurisdictions’ securities regulation regimes. However, it can be argued

189. Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, HARVARD BUS. REV. (1998),
https://hbr.org/1998/11/how-venture-capital-works (noting the relative rarity of
venture capital funds investing in start-up and very young stages of companies);
Dirk Engel & Max Keilbach, Firm-level Implications of Early Stage Venture Capital
Investment — An Empirical Investigation, 14 J. EMPIRICAL FINANCE 150 (2007).
190. Zider, supra note 189.
191. See generally Carol Goforth, Securities Treatment of Tokenized Offerings
under U.S. Law,’ 46 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 405 (2019).
192. Dirk Zetzsche et al., The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a Scam, it’s a Bubble, it’s a
Super Challenge for Regulators (University of Luxembourg Law Working Paper
No. 11/2017, UNSW Law. Res. Paper No. 17–83, University of Hong Kong Faculty
of Law Res. Paper No. 2017/035, European Banking Institute Working Paper Series
18/2018, Harvard Int’l L.J. Vol. 63, No.2, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3072298.
193. U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Report of Investigation
Pursuant to Section 21(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO (July
25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf [hereinafter
SEC Report]; SEC Guidance 2018, supra note 91.
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that ICOs are a different beast altogether, 194 and such pre-sales are
necessary in order to generate interest in and support for the project
under development, which would ultimately become a distributed
marketplace dependent on network effects. 195 Such pre-sales may
also co-opt users into a space of co-developing the experimental
software for the blockchain-based business in order to fix its bugs and
refine it for ultimate launch. 196 Most developers insist that such sales
are characterized as sales of future goods or services. 197 Needless to
say, the investor protection concerns in this phenomenon have drawn
securities regulators’ attention to the area. 198
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has in
particular taken a stringent approach to classifying most token offers
as securities offers. 199 The European Commission has also proposed to
treat offers of crypto-assets as financial assets that should be subject to
a regime of mandatory disclosure and civil liability for misleading or
false information. 200 The advent of regulatory treatment of this area
makes it timely for thinking about a different way forward. The
regulatory approaches may be regarded as being too path-dependent
on assumptions and approaches appropriate for different business
models and products. There is arguably insufficient consideration of
194. Philipp Hacker & Chris Thomale, Crypto-Securities Regulation: ICOs,
Token Sales and Cryptocurrencies under EU Financial Law, 15 EUROPEAN CO. &
FINANCIAL L. REV. 645 (2018); Lewis Rinaudo Cohen, Ain’t Misbehavin’: An
Examination of Broadway Tickets and Blockchain Tokens, 65 WAYNE L. REV 81
(2019).
195. Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto-Economics- The Top 100 Token Models Compared
(2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860.
196. Saman Adhami, Giancarlo Giudici & Stefano Martinazzi, Why do
Businesses Go Crypto? An Empirical Analysis of Initial Coin Offerings, 100 J.
ECON. & BUS.64 (2018) (noting that these types of ICOs are most likely to succeed).
197. See, e.g., The SAFT Project, available at https://saftproject.com/
(“SAFT,” or Simple Agreement for Future Tokens, has been developed as a
template for ICO offerings clarifying that sales are of tokens for future use); see also
Jiri Chod & Evgeny Lyandres, A Theory of ICOs: Diversification, Agency, and
Information Asymmetry’ (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3159528.
198. Iris H-Y Chiu, Decrypting the Trends of International Regulatory
Competition in Crypto-finance, 7 EUR. J. COMP. L. & GOVERNANCE 297 (2020)
(comparing securities regulators’ responses to token offerings in a range of different
jurisdictions).
199. SEC Guidance 2018, supra note 91.
200. European Commission Proposal 2020, supra note 154.
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the pre-development nature of token sales and the likely unsuitability
of a mandatory disclosure regime for regulation, premised upon
assumptions that all information is clear and conveyable to potential
investors. Further, although the European Commission purports to
mobilize crypto-asset offers by allowing developers to market offers
across the European Union if they comply with the regulation, there is
little thought in whether such mobilization would work if investors
need to access private cryptocurrency to engage with the offers.
Hence, what is missing is arguably regulatory thinking for an enabling
institution that bridges investors’ with dApp developers’ needs.
Drawing upon the theoretical framing of regulatory capitalism allows
us not only to think of the regulative aspects of the dApp economy as
a new economic order but also the enabling aspects in law and
regulation. 201 This Article proposes that a key enabling institution is a
starting and limited issuance of CBDC as tokens in exchange for
investors’ cash, for the specific channeling of investment to dApp
developers raising finance for project development.
This limited proposal serves a few objectives. First, it is poised to
map demand possibly at uneven levels across the euro area for CBDC
in relation to the dApp economy. Second, it supports and mobilizes
policy thinking on the “securities regulation” of token offerings, but
not in a siloed manner, as relevant regulators and the central bank
could take advantage of such an intersection to engage in interagency
dialogue and knowledge exchange with each other, ultimately
supporting the evolution of new institutional responses or
architecture. 202 Third, as dApp developments are aimed towards
becoming a live business, the facilitative role of CBDC for investment
into the crypto-economy brings about further intersections with a
wider mosaic of business and commercial law and regulation, in order
to serve wider economic facilitation purposes as well as regulative
purposes. In other words, the starting point of CBDC as facilitating
investment into a predevelopment dApp economy galvanizes and
mobilizes the policy mosaic for the dApp economy.
This Article proposes that CBDC should be issued in a tokenbased design for a limited rollout. CBDC should be issued as digital
201. See generally Barak Orbach, What is Regulation?, 30 YALE J.
REGULATION ONLINE 1 (2012).
202. See infra Part III, Section C, subd. (4).
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tokens against physical or digital cash tendered by individuals for the
purposes of investing in the crypto-economy. In this manner, the
public sector provides the facilitating institution of the CBDC while
the private sector provides both the opportunities for dApp economy
investment and the rise of private sector industries such as token
custodial services that would implement the limited rollout policy. It
is envisaged that such service providers would be subject to
regulation, as discussed below.
CBDC should not be issued under an account-based design in the
limited rollout proposal. In an account-based design, the central bank
would have to provide a fundamentally new service akin to a
brokerage account for investors, raising issues of customer-protection
roles as custodial agents and brokerage functions vis-á-vis dApp
issuers. Further, as the CBDC should be an enabling mechanism for
dApp economy investment, it is best that such investment interfaces
be provided by private sector services so that the investing public may
not confused as to the central bank’s role and mistakenly treat the
central bank as warranting the quality of such investments. In this
manner, the limited rollout proposal also supports the European
Commission’s overall policy of building out a pan-European digital
market, especially in terms of capital formation. In playing a
mobilizing role for the dApp economy, the limited rollout of CBDC
supports the building of the dApp economy within the Commission’s
new action plan for the Capital Markets Union. 203 In this new action
plan, the Digital Finance Package 204 is a building block to help small
and medium sized enterprises gain access to fundraising outside of the
traditional bank finance channels, while at the same time promoting
digital transformation in the Single Market.
In a token-based design, an investor would have to show that the
exchange for CBDC is for investment purposes, and custodial agents
would hold issued CBDC on trust for their respective account-holders
in order to commit the funds to regulated dApp issues. These custodial
services can generate the public and private key pairs for each
investor’s account and receive CBDC credited by the central bank for
203. Capital Markets Union Action Plan, supra note 76.
204. See European Commission, Communication: Digital Finance Package
(Sept. 24, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/200924-digital-financeproposals_en [hereinafter Digital Finance Package].
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investors’ tendered cash. They then facilitate the investment
transactions for investors. They would also be tasked with the
functions of anti-money laundering due diligence, custodial
safekeeping, and transfer for investments to be made. In such a set-up,
central banks would be relieved of direct service provision and some
of the onerous implications, but there should be overall regulatory
policy to subject custodial services to regulation and supervision. 205
In this manner, custodial agents also act like brokers, which
makes such a role unique and different from conventional financial
intermediaries. These service providers are envisaged to have
custodial, payment and brokerage functions; yet bundled in new ways.
They would also have responsibilities engaging with central banks,
investors, and the relevant dApp issuers. Custodial providers in the
private sector need to develop the requisite cryptographic expertise
and customer service interfaces. Expertise can be developed from
current wallet providers for cryptocurrencies. Existing payment
services institutions may also see the market opportunity to foray into
providing these services and many of them are already overseen by
national central banks in the euro area. 206 Regulatory and supervision
implications would arise, but alongside new business opportunities
and innovation.
The proposal above clearly shows that where the CBDC paves the
way as an enabling mechanism in investing in the dApp economy,
other regulatory policy issues are engaged, such as subjecting
custodial agents to regulatory supervision and standards. The
205. See, e.g., Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending
Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (recast), art.16(8) (describing
organizational requirements including custodial regulation) [hereinafter E.U.
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID 2014)].
206. The European Banking Authority maintains a register of national central
banks that also authorize and oversee payment services providers under the Payment
Services Directive. The primary responsibility of national central banks in payments
regulation and supervision is described as based on an intergovernmental ethos of
power and responsibility in the European Union, such that payment oversight power
is not concentrated in the ECB. See Dermot Hodson, De Novo Bodies and the New
Intergovernmentalism: The Case of the European Central Bank, in THE NEW
INTERGOVERNMENTALISM: STATES AND SUPRANATIONAL ACTORS IN THE POSTMAASTRICHT ERA (Christopher J. Bickerton, Dermot Hodson & Uwe Puetter eds.,
2015).
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regulatory policy agenda can thus be “built out” more holistically,
integrating the investment, commercial and financial needs of the
crypto-economy. This is a more optimal vision of outworking for
regulatory capitalism in the dApp economy than an incremental
approach that seeks minimal disruption with existing regulatory
ontologies.
In this manner, it may be criticized that the European
Commission’s proposals to regulate crypto-asset offerings and service
providers are too limited and draw excessively from existing
regulatory frameworks without necessarily providing a good fit with
crypto-economy needs. Crypto-asset offerings would be regulated via
the mandatory disclosure of a prescribed white paper, subject to
investor civil litigation for false or misleading disclosure. “Cryptoassets” are defined as a digital representation of value or rights, with
reference to electronic storage and transfer via distributed ledger
technology. The Commission established three regulatory regimes for
crypto-assets, and a regime for “crypto-asset service providers” in
general. Crypto-assets that are collateralized stablecoins, or “assetreferenced, as well as those that electronically reference fiat
currencies, or known as “e-money” tokens are regulated differently
from the rest of crypto-assets.
Crypto-assets other than “asset-referenced” or “e-money” cryptoassets can be publicly offered across the European Union, regulated
by way of legal entity registration in any Member State and the
publication of a prescribed white paper, which contains mandatory
disclosure. However, exemptions are made for offers not exceeding €1
million in 12 months, or made to a small number of natural person
investors not exceeding 150, or made to professional investors only. If
the crypto-assets are obtained by gratuitous helicopter drops, or by
mining, or are unique and non-fungible in nature, they are not subject
to the public offer regulatory regime.
As many ICOs raise over €1 million,207 the low threshold for
exemption is unlikely useful for many dApp developers. Although the
prescribed white paper is less onerous than the well-developed

207. Kate Rooney, A blockchain start-up just raised $4 billion without a live
product, CNBC (May 31, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/31/a-blockchainstart-up-just-raised-4-billion-without-a-live-product.html.
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mandatory disclosure regime of prospectus disclosure for securities, 208
the categories of transparency required are ideologically derived from
such established regimes, i.e., in relation to developers’ information,
legal entity information, or information regarding rights of holders,
among others. The mandatory disclosure regime is accompanied by
market discipline in terms of civil responsibility for inaccurate or
misleading disclosure. For pre-development dApps where the
information environment is tentative, this can be an onerous obligation
subjecting developers to significant legal risk.
Crypto-asset service providers would be regulated under an
umbrella category, subject to prudential requirements, mandatory
insurance support, general rules of conduct of business— such as fair
treatment of customers and management of conflicts of interest—as
well as organizational and governance requirements pertaining to
business continuity and cybersecurity. There is a lack of thinking as to
what manners of service providers, especially novel ones may arise in
the dApp economy, and a blanket extension of conduct regulation may
not be appropriate, especially if these service providers have no direct
dealing with users or may be decentralized in governance.
The proposed regulatory approach outlined above shows that the
European Union may embark on regulating the financial and payment
aspects of the crypto-economy in a manner highly derived from
existing regulation and in a siloed manner, ignoring the commercial
and economic contexts of the crypto-economy. Hence, this Article
argues for a different regulatory policy approach that should first be
focused on enabling economic development, accompanied by
appropriate governance. This Article also suggests that the CBDC can
fulfill such an enabling function and pave the way for developing a
broader framework of governance in engagement with dApp economy
participants.
It may be queried why CBDC is needed as private e-money
providers can issue programmable digital fiat currencies for
investment or payment in the dApp economy, such as the USD Coin
issued by registered money service business Circle in the United
States. The USD Coin is fully programmable in Ethereum blockchain208. See Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 14 June 2017 on the prospectus to be published when securities are
offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market, and repealing
Directive 2003/71/EC, art. 6 [hereinafter Prospectus Regulation].
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based applications. 209 The European Commission’s proposal,
however, treats such an issuance as e-money regulated under bank or
electronic money issuer regulations, 210 therefore ignoring the potential
of integration into the dApp economy, or at least failing to account for
such integration and regulatory implications. Moreover, CBDC would
be programmed and “signed” by the ESCB and is not a claim upon a
private sector issuer (which is what privately issued electronic money
amounts to) whose risk of insolvency the recipient runs. It may
nevertheless be argued that as e-money issuers are regulated
prudentially, the risk faced by customers of issuer failure is small.
However, despite prudential regulation, if we rely on e-money
creation by the private sector for the limited rollout proposal, e-money
providers can engage in leverage generation 211 for speculative instead
of genuine investment purposes, and may fuel bubbles in token prices.
The limited rollout of CBDC for investment can galvanize
development in the dApp economy and bring us a step closer towards
the institutional interface between the dApp economy and the
mainstream economy. Such an enabling role for the CBDC must,
however, be accompanied by more holistic and complex thinking in
relation to substantive regulation and regulatory architecture. Before
this Article turns to these issues, it will briefly canvass the legal
mandate for the central bank is able to accommodate CBDCs. It will
argue that the legal mandate for the ESCB is able to accommodate the
limited rollout proposal in the euro area. This is appropriate for an
experimental rollout and there is also empirical evidence regarding
dApp development interest in the euro area. 212
A. The Legal Framework for Issuance of CBDC for the Euro Area
The ECB has the exclusive right to issue euro banknotes as legal
tender in the euro-area. 213 In practice, national central banks (“NCB”)
209. See Circle, supra note 166.
210. See generally E.U. Electronic Money Directive, supra note 167.
211. Id. art. 6 (noting credit creation can be undertaken by electronic money
institutions).
212. Fromberger & Haffke, supra note 95.
213. European Union, Consolidated Version of the Treaty for the Functioning
of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, OJ L. 326/47-326/390 art. 128, available at
https://www.refworld.org/docid/52303e8d4.html [hereinafter TFEU].
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undertake such issue subject to the ECB’s approval, as the ECB has
limited institutional facilities for organizing banknote production and
distribution.214 In relation to coins, NCBs are primarily responsible for
issuing them. 215 This system ensures that although the ECB has
centralized authority over the monetary functions in the euro area,
decentralized implementation is carried out based on the existing
institutional facilities as being most practical and efficient.
It may be queried whether the issuance of digital euros should be
regarded as “banknotes” or “coins.” One also notes that tokens issued
by dApp developers in fundraising have also been called “coins.” The
difference between banknotes and coins in Article 128 of the Treaty
for the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) relates to
difference in denomination. This difference in denomination is
meaningful as the physical representation of notes and coins differ.
Physical representation is currently differentiated according to
denomination, i.e., banknote for €5 and above in terms of
denomination, and coin for €2 and below. 216 Where digital currency is
concerned, the digitalization of form cuts across the need for
differentiating between denominations and consequent production.
Although the use of language reflects the assumption of physical
representation, it is arguable, on a teleological basis, 217 that the digital
versions of euros would still fall to be interpreted as digital euro
banknotes or coins depending on denomination. Article 128 can be
interpreted teleologically as including physical as well as digital

214. See generally CHRISTOS V. GORTSOS, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANKING
LAW: THE ROLE OF THE ECB AND NATIONAL CENTRAL BANKS UNDER EUROPEAN
LAW 281–329 (2020); Martin Seidel, The Constitutional Design of the European
Central
Bank
(CESifo
DICE
Report,
2012),
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/167064/1/ifo-dice-report-v10-y2012-i1p14-20.pdf.
215. TFEU, supra note 213, art. 128(2).
216. See Decision of the European Central Bank of 19 April 2013 on the
denominations, specifications, reproduction, exchange and withdrawal of euro
banknotes (recast) (ECB/2013/10) (2013/211/EU), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32013D0010 [hereinafter European Central
Bank Decision].
217. Frank Elderson, Legal Interpretation within the ESCB: Is there Method in
It?, in LIBER AMICORUM & PAOLO ZAMBONI GARAVELLI, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE
EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS 235–257 (European Central Bank, 2005).
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representations of the same subject matter. 218 However, within the
confines of the TFEU, it is arguably not possible to treat digital
currency issued by the central bank as a species outside of “banknote”
or “coin.”
The express competence for minting coins on the part of NCBs
may constrain the interpretation of Article 128, meaning that there is
only scope for the ECB to directly issue CBDC in denominations of
€5 and above. However, as banknote denomination is a policy decided
by the ECB,219 the policy to denominate €5 and above in the form of
banknote can be reconsidered by the ECB. It is also possible for the
ECB to issue separate decisions for denominations of physical
banknotes and coins, alongside digital banknotes and coins, 220 with
the digital banknote having a lower range of denominations than the
physical range. It can be questioned whether digital banknotes can be
denominated in low ranges, phasing out coins entirely. This is
permissible under the TFEU as coin issuance seems discretionary for
NCBs. Further as Article 128 envisages that both the ECB and NCBs
can issue banknotes under the ECB’s authorization, defining lower
ranges of denominations for digital banknotes does not adversely
affect competence between the ECB and NCBs. The potential
issuance of low-denominated digital banknote euros would also meet
the needs of the crypto-economy as many tokens trade in secondary
markets in fractions of a U.S. dollar.
Although digital banknotes can be defined in lower denomination
ranges and can equally be issued by the ECB directly or by NCBs, this
Article supports a decentralized system where NCBs could be the
primary issuers, subject to the overall oversight and approval of the
ECB, in relation to the broader policy relating to issuing CBDC in the
limited rollout proposal. This would also entail little change in
218. See Nabilou, supra note 44.
219. European Central Bank Decision, supra note 216.
220. Cf. Advocate General Giovanni Pitruzzella’s opinion in Advocate
General’s Opinion in Joined Cases C-422/19 Press and Information Johannes
Dietrich and C-423/19 Norbert Häring v Hessischer Rundfunk (arguably supporting
separate provision for the CBDC and its status as legal tender); see also Press
Release No. 119/20, Court of Justice of the European Union, According to Advocate
General Pitruzzella, EU law provides that creditors have an obligation in principle to
accept cash in euros for the payment of monetary debts (Sept. 29, 2020),
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-09/cp200119en.pdf.
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practice from the present dominant role of NCBs issuing physical
banknotes and coins.
It may be queried whether by analogy with electronic money,
CBDC is therefore not ‘“legal tender.” Although the Electronic
Money Directive provides for recognition and regulation of electronic
money without specifying legal tender, scholars argue that the implicit
assumption of the Directive is that it must deal with legally recognized
currencies in the European Union on the basis of the assumptions of
stable value made in the Directive and the obligations issuers are
imposed with in relation to the exchange or redemption of electronic
money. 221 Whether CBDC is technically legal tender would unlikely
affect its favorable perception at a practical level. The advantage of
legal tender is that creditors are obliged to accept legal tender in
discharge of a debt. This advantage is not highly applicable in the
context of the limited rollout proposal. In the investment context,
investors make an offer to buy tokens which issuers accept, and
issuers are free to set conditions of acceptance such as payment by
CBDC or other cryptocurrency. CBDC issuance should be geared
towards incentivizing not forcing its adoption. However, if a policy
choice to make CBDC indisputably legal tender is made, in view of
the ECB’s interest in rolling out more widely for e-commerce and
retail payment, it becomes more imperative for the ECB to consider
issuing a decision on the denominations of digital banknotes so that
lower ranges can meet the definition of “legal tender” under the
TFEU.
B. Institutional Structure for Issuance of CBDC in the European
System of Central Banks
Although the ECB has exclusive competence to issue euro
“banknotes,” and we argue that digital banknotes can be defined to be
in lower denomination ranges, in practice, the ECB and NCBs work
closely together in issuing euro banknotes, and NCBs undertake much
of the issue anyway. This Article argues that it is structurally optimal
for NCBs to take on the primary responsibility for issuing CBDC.

221. Anton N. Didenko & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution of Currency: Cash
to Cryptos to Sovereign Digital Currencies, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1041 (2019).
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At a decentralized level, NCBs may face different levels of
demand for CBDC as there is an uneven level of interest and
participation in the dApp economy across Europe. Although the dApp
economy spans global borders, developers commonly start as a
socially close-knit group in particular geographically-precise
locations, 222 such as the Silicon Valley in the United States. In
Europe, Switzerland, Germany, Lithuania, and the United Kingdom
are highly popular jurisdictions where token offerings have been
based, 223 and other euro area countries such as France and Spain are
popular too. In this manner, due to different levels of demand across
the euro area, NCBs can be well-placed to discover locally-generated
needs. Further, the limited rollout proposal supports investment in the
dApp economy and regulatory oversight of this is carried out by
national agencies dealing with capital formation and investment
regulation. There is no pan-European investment markets regulator, as
the European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”) is a body
overseeing and coordinating national regulators who remain at the
forefront of regulatory tasks. NCBs can work with national securities
regulators in mapping the developments in the dApp economy and
developing regulatory policy, as discussed below.
This does not mean that CBDC issuance should be carried out in a
fragmented manner. The ESCB is the institutional architecture that
maintains coordination and coherence in NCBs’ actions as steered by
the ECB. The ECB’s leadership is required for a number of specific
considerations below.
First, the ECB must decide for what purpose the CBDC should be
programmed. Should the CBDC be programmed for an alternative
protocol infrastructure, so that the ESCB takes on the role of
providing competing blockchain infrastructure in the dApp economy?
This initiative could be similar to the state-backed blockchain protocol
initiative in China, 224 where an “official” infrastructure is offered
alongside privately constructed ones. The benefit of such an
infrastructure could be the implicit promise for maintenance and
222. Bousfield, supra note 79.
223. See generally Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Coin Offerings: The Top 25
Jurisdictions and their Comparative Regulatory Responses (as of May 2018), 1
STANFORD J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 41 (2018).
224. See, e.g., Blockchain-based Service Network, available at
https://bsnbase.io/g/main/index.
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robustness underwritten by the public sector, and choice for
entrepreneurs. It should also be considered whether such an
innovation should be made open source and available for adoption or
should result in proprietary rights subject to licensing for the ESCB.
Making technological provision open source likely increases and
encourages uptake although making it proprietary and subject to
licensing may allow a regulatory channel to be constructed so as to
select and supervise adopters and users. In the alternative, should the
ESCB work with the private sector so that CBDC is programmed to be
compatible with infrastructure protocol such as the Ethereum
blockchain? This is arguably preferred as the Ethereum blockchain
enjoys significant network effects for dApp enterprise development.
Further, developing programmability of the CBDC with experienced
private sector innovators may yield useful insights for technological
learning for the public sector and public-private coordination for
policy developments in the future. These decisions need to be decided
at the level of the ESCB overall orchestrated under the ECB, and it
would be beneficial for the ECB to take leadership in a unified form
of engagement with the private sector.
Policy centralization at the ECB level also arguably matches with
the broader purpose of the CBDC, which pursuant to Article 127 of
the TFEU, relates to the ECB’s support of general economic policies
in the European Union with a view to contributing to the achievement
of its objectives. 225 This includes the Digital Single Market, which is
intended to promote cross-border e-commerce and the Digital Finance
Package 226 supporting the single capital market. 227 The limited rollout
proposal does not offend the needs for institutional independence and
stature. 228 However, it paves the way for innovation in regulatory
coordination and architecture, as the enabling institution of the CBDC
lights the way for complementary policy development to support and
govern the dApp economy. We turn to sketch out a blueprint for key
225. TFEU, supra note 213, arts. 3, 127.
226. Digital Finance Package, supra note 204 (outlining policy umbrella for
the European Commission’s proposal to regulate cryptoassets).
227. European Commission Proposal 2020, supra note 154.
228. See generally HAROLD JAMES, MAKING THE EUROPEAN MONETARY
UNION (2012); Werner Bonefield, Ordoliberalism and Political Theology: On the
Government of Stateless Money, in ORDOLIBERALISM, LAW AND THE RULE OF
ECONOMICS (Josef Hien & Christian Joerges eds., 2017).
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aspects of wider policy and regulatory thinking for mobilizing the
dApp economy as a governed capitalist order. 229
C. A Brief Blueprint for the Regulatory Design and Architecture
Implications for Supporting and Regulating the dApp Economy in the
European Single Market
The enabling role of the CBDC paves the way for regulatory
rethinking of the implications for the scope and design of appropriate
policy to address the needs of the dApp economy, and how regulatory
architecture at the national and E.U. levels may be adjusted in
response. In other words, the facilitative role of the CBDC paves the
way for development of a regulatory capitalist order that engages with
the roles of the public sector, in terms of providing regulatory
governance, and the private sector, in relation to innovation and
growth.
The role of the public sector can further involve issues
surrounding the fitness of existing regulatory institutions, reform of
substantive regulatory law, and the mandates of existing regulatory
agencies.
This Section discusses the contours of such implications in four
respects:
1. The rise of new intermediaries for facilitating investment
in the dApp economy;
2. The need for a complementary regime of ICO regulation,
which need not be the same as fully-fledged securities
regulation;
3. The need to consider more broadly business and
commercial policy for the dApp economy as business
projects become live and economic activity in the dApp
economy takes shape; and
4. The need to consider how national central banks and
relevant regulatory agencies may interact and coordinate
to address the policy needs of the dApp economy, and how
such interactions and coordination are further advanced
through the E.U. institutional levels involving the ECB
and relevant European agencies, such as the regulatory
229. See IRIS H-Y CHIU, REGULATING THE CRYPTO-ECONOMY (Oxford: Hart,
forthcoming 2022) (developing detailed proposals for regulating the dApp
economy).
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bodies in the
Supervision. 230

European

System

for

Financial

1. The Rise of New Intermediaries for Facilitating Investment in the
dApp Economy
Under the limited rollout of CBDC proposal for investment into
the dApp economy, a key new market player that would arise is the
custodial agent for token-based CBDC. These custodial agents on the
one hand serve bank-like functions but they are not banks because
they are not envisaged to have full intermediation and money-creation
functions. 231 They would have duties and responsibilities to national
central banks with whom they exchange investors’ cash for CBDC, to
their customers, in terms of brokerage-like functions, and also to token
issuers in relation to anti-money laundering due diligence and transfer
functions. The existing industry of wallet services for cryptocurrency
may be appropriate for developing such services, and many wallet
services are provided by cryptocurrency exchanges. 232 It would be
important for policy-makers to engage with the private sector in order
to understand current business models and to signal as to impending
regulatory developments, and both the opportunities and compliance
needs for service providers in this area. Regulatory obligations are
already imposed under the fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive,233
but regulatory policy should be further tailored to specific risks of
these services in relation to multi-way accountability to central banks,
230. The System is comprised of the European Banking Authority, the
European Securities and Markets Authority, the European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority, and a joint committee of the three to look at crosssectoral issues. See Regulation (EU) 1093/2010 (establishing the European Banking
Authority).
231. See generally PETER BOFINGER, MONETARY POLICY: GOALS,
INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIES, AND INSTRUMENTS (2001) (discussing custodial agents
for token-based CBDC).
232. See generally Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Advancing
a Framework for Regulating Cryptocurrency Payment Intermediaries, 32 YALE J.
ON REG. 295 (2015).
233. See Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of
the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist
financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU, art. 2.
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token issuer regulators, and investors. In this manner, this Article
argues that the European Commission’s proposal to regulate cryptoasset service providers is too broad-brush as no meaningful distinction
is made amongst many novel types of services arising in the cryptoeconomy space. There are nevertheless useful aspects such as
custodial duties akin to brokers, 234 and customer due diligence
standards akin to under the Payment Services Directive. 235
Further, it should be considered whether custodial agents may
participate or diversify into investment services such as advisory
services regarding the quality of token offers, and how those should be
overseen. The Commission’s proposed regulation for serviceproviders treats all manners of service providers in a group to be
subject to similar prudential and conduct of business regulation. There
is a need to consider how risks pertaining to different activities can be
further understood for regulatory treatment.
In light of the rise of secondary trading markets for tokens, 236 the
International Organization of Securities Commissioners (“IOSCO”)
has proposed that regulators consider regulating these marketplaces in
view of investor protection issues such as standards of trading, market
abuse, and market transparency. 237 The European Commission’s
proposal reflects these, but these assumptions are made on the basis
that trading exchanges are centralized in nature. Innovation in the
crypto-economy and the arrival of decentralized exchanges 238 may
pose challenges to narrowly-defined regulatory categories. Regulatory
capitalism in this space could be reflected by more intense
engagement with private sector innovators and business developers,
moving away from ontological assumptions with conventional
financial service providers, so that regulatory policy can be
234. See E.U. Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID 2014),
supra note 205, art. 16(8).
235. E.U. Electronic Money Directive, supra note 167, art. 97 (relating to
strong customer authentication).
236. Such as Poloniex.com, Tokenmarket.net, and Idex.com.
237. BOARD OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES
COMMISSIONS, ISSUES, RISKS AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO
CRYPTO-ASSET
TRADING
PLATFORMS
(Feb.
2020),
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD649.pdf.
238. See, e.g., Uniswap, available at https://uniswap.org (facilitating liquidity
pools).
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dynamically informed. Further, new intermediaries facilitating
investment into the dApp economy also include token rating services,
which are currently unregulated. 239 The extent of investor reliance on
them should be subject to observation in considering if regulatory
standards are needed. The operation of pan-European service
provision by intermediaries in this space also gives rise to implications
for intersections between national agencies for regulation and
supervision or elevation of such supervision to the European agency
level. 240
2. The Need for a Complementary Regime of ICO Regulation
As proposed earlier in this Article, ICOs should be regulated
differently from securities offerings as they are pre-development in
nature, 241 and raise different information asymmetry and investor
protection risks. Although researchers have empirically observed that
the quality of voluntary disclosure in ICOs, in the form of white
papers, is sub-optimal in most cases, mandatory disclosure regulation
under securities regulation may not be the appropriate regime for
ICOs. 242
ICOs usually take place with perhaps no relevant track record for
investors to observe, and the informational environment for investors
may be unprecedentedly thin. This is not necessarily an issue of
information asymmetry, i.e., that issuers have more information held
to their chests than available to investors. This is an environment of
information anemia as both issuers and investors are wading into a
239. Such as ICObench.com and ICOratings.com. See Jongsub Lee, Tao Li &
Donghwa Shin, The Wisdom of Crowds and Information Cascades in Fintech:
Evidence
from
Initial
Coin
Offerings
(2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3226051
(describing
the
usefulness and predictive power of ratings); Thomas Bourveau et al., Information
Intermediaries
in
the
Crypto-Tokens
Market
(2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3193392. However, some
commentators are of the view that the ratings services provide flawed ratings even
for crypto-businesses that do not need to use a blockchain. See Chen Feng et al.,
Initial Coin Offerings, Blockchain Technology, and White Paper Disclosures (2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3256289.
240. See infra Part III, Section C, subd. (4).
241. Collomb, de Fillippi & Sok, supra note 91.
242. Zetzsche et al., supra note 192.
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speculative venture with much information to discover. Hence there
may be a case for less reliance on extensive mandatory disclosure
regulation, and to supplement with a regulatory regime that provides
for more investor control so as to monitor the development of the
project.
There may be a case for regulatory design that facilitates post-sale
investor monitoring. Post-sale monitoring is important as ICOs result
in a frontloading phenomenon whereby dApp issuers get all of the
proceeds for development before anything is started. 243 Regulation
can be aimed at mitigating developers’ agency risk, especially
behavioral sub-optimalities associated with investment frontloading
that exacerbates such risk, as well as to allow investors to observe the
outworking of business viability and investment value risks.
Regulatory design can include staged financing and escrow
arrangements, which is proposed by Usha Rodrigues as similar to the
kind of contractually agreed post-investment monitoring carried out in
a venture capital investment in a start-up company. 244 Such a
regulatory design would involve different obligations from under
securities regulation, and possibly new intermediaries with new
obligations in relation to staged financing monitoring and custodial
safeguarding of funds.
Regulatory thinking for ICOs has developed in a rather siloed
manner and in response to fears of regulatory arbitrage. For example
in the United States, since the SEC’s investigative report that the
initial coin offering made by the DAO was an unregistered securities
offering, 245 the “securities” definition could be applied in an
extensive manner to ICOs. The SEC’s guidance 246 has developed
further to capture tokens with trading and appreciative characteristics
even if these exist alongside functional or potentially functional
characteristics (for projects under development). 247 The more
243. Xin Deng, Yen-Teik Lee & Zhengting Zhong, Decrypting Coin Winners:
Disclosure Quality, Governance Mechanism and Team Networks (2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3247741
(discussing
the
frontloading phenomenon).
244. See generally Usha R. Rodrigues, Financial Contracting with the Crowd,
69 EMORY L.J. 397 (2019).
245. SEC Report, supra note 193.
246. Id.
247. Rohr & Wright, supra note 88.
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dominantly functional tokens are, in comparison to their tradeability
or potential to provide gain as “financialize” items, the more likely
they are not securities. A number of indicators are suggested by the
SEC in order to determine if tokens are closer to the end of the
financialized spectrum or the functional end, such as whether
centralized efforts exist to develop the project and arrange for tokens
to be traded, as opposed to ministerial functions for the blockchain
system. It would also be relevant whether the token is offered more
broadly (presumably to attract investment interest) or more narrowly
to a targeted market interested in functionality.
The SEC’s presumption of functionality versus financialization
for characterizing tokens as securities can arguably be misplaced as
tokens likely have both sets of characteristics. Financialization need
not undercut the functional characteristics that exist in an asset, as we
think about residential property as being both fully functional and
financialized in many developed economies. Further, it seems unduly
restrictive to prevent tokens from being successful both functionally
and financially. In light of significant regulatory uncertainty for ICOs,
developers have turned to new legal mechanisms, such as a Simple
Agreement for Future Tokens (“SAFT”) 248 that provides a template
for token offers to be made only to accredited investors in the United
States, therefore exempting developers from having to register with
the SEC as a public securities offer. 249 The SEC’s approach is likely
to funnel ICOs down “safe” exemptions in relation to small offers
such as Regulation A or A+ or Regulation D 250 for accredited
investors. This may severely curtail retail participation. As dApp
businesses are fundamentally peer-to-peer networks that provide
opportunities for anyone to join in the enterprise efforts as well as

248. See, e.g., The SAFT Project, supra note 197.
249. See Regulation D Offerings, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission,
available
at
https://www.investor.gov/introductionINVESTOR.GOV,
investing/investing-basics/glossary/regulation-d-offerings.
250. Id. See also Regulation A, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission,
SEC.GOV, available at https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/exemptofferings/rega.
Regulation A+ is the SEC’s implementation of Title IV of the JOBS Act. See Press
Release, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, SEC Adopts Rules to Facilitate
Smaller
Companies’
Access
to
Capital
(Mar.
25,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-49.html.
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financialized prospects, 251 the prevention of retail participation in the
name of retail investor protection ironically leads to the result of their
marginalization from an innovative economic frontier. This may be
contrary to the ethos and intentions of dApp developers. Further if
developers are forced to fundraise in private markets, the
demographics of the dApp economy can be radically shaped by
involving largely financiers instead of economic actors from a diverse
landscape.
In the European Union, early mover Member States like Malta
have taken a different approach to ICOs and treat tokens offered as
suis generis financial products. This is also now reflected in the
European Commission’s proposal. In 2018, the Maltese Virtual
Financial Assets Act 2018 was passed to provide a legitimate channel
for ICOs to be legally offered in Malta. Virtual assets cover the scope
of digital tokens that are not merely for consumption, payment, or are
financial instrument falling within European legislation definitions.
The Act requires an issuer of virtual assets to be a legal person in
Malta, and a white paper with items of mandatory disclosure are to be
filed and published. A summary that is in plain language and more
narrative in nature should also be published for ease of use by retail
investors. This mimics the E.U. securities regulation regime in the
Prospectus Regulation 252 and forms the same basis for the European
Commission’s proposal to regulate crypto-assets. 253 The Act provides
for some general principles for the conduct of issuers, such as the
management of conflicts of interest, conducting business with
integrity, due care, skill and diligence and under proper control, 254
which have also found their way into the European Commission’s
proposal. It is uncertain if these duties are ongoing in nature or apply
to the point of marketing and sale of tokens to investors. These duties
are also relatively open-ended and it is uncertain if any regulatory
enforcement supports such duties. The Maltese regime perhaps relies
251. Alyse Killeen, The Confluence of Bitcoin and the Global Sharing
Economy, in HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL CURRENCY: BITCOIN, INNOVATION, FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS, AND BIG DATA (David Lee Kuo Chuen ed. 2015).
252. See Prospectus Regulation, supra note 208.
253. European Commission Proposal 2020, supra note 154.
254. Malta Virtual Financial Assets Act § 9 (2018), cap. 590, available
at
http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/Download
Document.aspx?app=lom&
itemid=12872&l=1.
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more significantly on investment limits for investor protection.
Investments in ICOs are limited to €5,000 per retail investor.
Investment limits arguably allow the regulator to mitigate regulatory
risk since investor losses are capped. This is close to the United
Kingdom’s regulatory regime for equity crowdfunding, which limits
retail investor outlay to 10 percent of net investible assets. 255 Investor
limits can be perceived as an investor protection measure that protects
against consumer detriment, while reducing the need for too many
regulatory standards to be imposed on issuers, or in the case of equity
crowdfunding regulation, on platforms. Investors may also pursue
civil liability for a white paper which contains untrue, misleading,
inconsistent, and inaccurate statements. 256 The Maltese Act requires
an issuer to appoint a Virtual Financial agent that would be
responsible for the anti-money laundering compliance side of fundraising, in relation to the standards of due diligence consistent with the
European legislation on anti-money laundering. On the whole the
Maltese regime, and arguably the Commission’s proposal, seem to
offer a light version of the European Union’s “gold standards” for
securities regulation. However, Malta’s regime for investor limits is
not replicated in the Commission’s proposal.
Unlike the Maltese regime that aims at investor protection by
capping investment, the Commission’s approach is to import the
consumer protection tenet of cooling-off rights by allowing for a
mandatory 14-day period for withdrawal by investors. In comparison
to the Maltese regime for disclosure and civil liability, the
Commission’s proposal may be more onerous with more
prescriptions. Nevertheless, the passport for making an offer
throughout the European Union may be attractive to investors.
However, it is uncertain if the Maltese and Commission’s recent
templates, heavily derived from securities regulation, cohere with the
needs of the blockchain-based community. First, if the “issuer” to be
incorporated is the developer, the developer may not wish to be
formalized as a company and be subject to a state’s company law
rules. This is because in some dApp projects such as Filecoin 257 and
255. See FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, FCA HANDBOOK, COBS 4.7.10,
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/COBS/4/7.html
[hereinafter
FCA
HANDBOOK].
256. Id. COBS 4.2.
257. See Filecoin, supra note 116.
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Decentraland, 258 the developers envisage withdrawal from the project
in due course as it becomes mature, so that the blockchain can be left
entirely into the hands of the community of participants to operate and
maintain. The need to incorporate and maintain ongoing compliance
with company or securities rules may be disincentivizing.
Next, if the tokens are to be offered over the blockchain platform,
then would such a platform be regarded as the “legal entity” that needs
to be duly registered or incorporated in any E.U. Member State, as
required under the E.U. regime? How should a blockchain platform be
treated in terms of legal organization? Blockchain systems are often
regarded as peer-to-peer marketplaces and not legal persons such as
corporations. The corporation is a hierarchical legal person and does
not reflect relational realities in the blockchain system. If there is
indeed a regulatory lacuna in relation to the treatment of the
community of participants that comprises the blockchain system,
would such enterprises not be able to attain “legal entity” status,
except perhaps in Malta, as only Malta offers a tailor-made legal
organizational regime for blockchain platforms? 259 If a blockchain
platform were to forcibly be fit into an existing organizational
category in a Member State, would token-holders have clarity in
relation to the governance of the system and their rights? In a peer-topeer blockchain system, there is no ready ascertainment of the
management organ. Would miners or core developers be regarded as
taking on that role and the enormous responsibilities that normally
attach to management? 260 It remains unclear if token-holders are the
equivalent of shareholders of incorporated companies and whether the
rights, duties, and liabilities established in corporate law jurisprudence
should apply. These questions are currently not answered by either the
Commission nor Member States.
Derivative regulatory approaches to regulating token offerings
potentially miss the unique features of such fundraising and fail to
meet their purposes. Changing regulators’ perspectives from a
regulative focus to one that considers the enabling and mobilizing
258. See Decentraland, supra note 110.
259. See generally Malta Innovative Technological Arrangements and
Services Act (2018), cap. 592, available at https://legislation.mt/eli/cap/592/eng/pdf.
260. Angela Walch, In Cod(ers) We Trust, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN:
TECHNO-SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES (Philipp Hacker et al. eds., 2019).
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aims for the dApp economy would entail a difference in approach
toward regulatory policy—toward being more holistic and engaged
with the new economic structures that are being revealed in the dApp
economy. In this manner, the uniqueness of ICOs as pre-development
funding can be recognized and policy-makers can consider a more
bespoke regulatory regime, as outlined above.
3. The Need to Consider More Broadly Business and Commercial
Policy for the dApp Economy
As dApp developers plan to develop blockchain-based networks
into live businesses, these new businesses and their structures, as well
as their commercial operations may raise questions in relation to
regulatory arbitrage and institutional fit. In the sharing economy
space, well-canvassed examples of regulatory arbitrage include Uber,
which has resisted being categorized as a taxi service 261 and as an
employer of drivers who may indeed work full-time hours for Uber. 262
Prosumers on blockchain-based networks may avoid being regulated
like business entities providing similar services, but may also not
benefit from consumer protection. 263 These regulatory lacunae need to
be considered in relation to how standards and expectations may be
safeguarded while allowing prosumers to engage in commercial
freedoms and innovation. Such business and commercial regulatory
policy is likely to span a number of sectors. In particular, financial
regulators would need to consider how dApp businesses attempting to
decentralize financial services such as in creating swaps, or providing
lending should be treated in the “DeFi” space. 264 This area is
burgeoning with innovation and needs to be considered in relation to
261. See generally Michèle Finck, Distinguishing Internet Platforms from
Transport Services: Elite Taxi v. Uber Spain, 55 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 1619
(2018).
262. See generally Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform
Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 HARVARD L. & POL’Y REV. 480 (2016).
263. See Florian Möslein, Conflicts of Laws and Codes: Defining the
Boundaries of Digital Jurisdictions, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN: TECHNO-SOCIAL
AND LEGAL CHALLENGES (Philipp Hacker et al. eds., 2019); see also U.K. Consumer
Rights Act 2015, §§ 49, 57, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/notes
(may apply).
264. Wulf A. Kaal, Digital Asset Markets Evolution (forthcoming, Journal of
Corporation Law, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3606663.
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mitigating regulatory arbitrage 265 while not discouraging useful
disruptive innovation. 266
4. The Need to Consider Regulatory Intersections and Coordination at
National and E.U. Levels
The broader regulatory blueprint for the dApp economy would
likely involve regulatory intersections and coordination at national
levels and between national and E.U. levels.
The intersection between national central banks and financial
regulators such as securities regulators may not be unfamiliar, as euro
area Member States with single regulators, 267 or single regulators
under the central bank’s auspices 268 could look at constructing
coordinative channels or organizing internally within the central bank
such joined-up capacity. Member States with disparate regulators 269
with their own remits and turfs to maintain may face more challenges
in terms of being path dependent. They may prefer to fit novel dApp
economy issues into existing regulatory categories, such as how the
United States with its disparate regulators have taken an approach of
“coherentism” 270 rather than regulatory reform towards the
phenomena raised by the dApp economy. 271 That said, in considering
265. See Usha Rodrigues, Semi-Public Offerings? Pushing the Boundaries of
Securities Law (U. Georgia School of L. Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 2018–30,
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3242205.
266. Joseph Bower & Clayton Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: Catching
the Wave, HARVARD BUS. REV. 43–53 (1995).
267. Such as Germany, Denmark, Finland, Austria, Sweden, Latvia, and
Poland.
268. Such as Hungary, Czech Republic, Ireland, Lithuania, and Slovakia.
269. Such as sectoral regulators between banking, insurance and
investment/securities regulation, e.g., Italy, France, Spain, Belgium, Cyprus, Greece,
The Netherlands, Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Romania, Bulgaria,
Croatia, and Slovenia.
270. See BROWNSWORD, supra note 183, at 191–196 (discussing
“coherentism” as a regulatory mindset that seeks excessively to fit new
developments into existing ontologies by default instead of considering the need for
reform).
271. See generally Chiu, supra note 198. See also M. Todd Henderson & Max
Raskin, A Regulatory Classification of Digital Assets: Towards an Operational
Howey Test for Cryptocurrencies, ICOs, and Other Digital Assets (2019 Columbia
Bus. L. Rev. 444, U. Chicago Coase-Sandor Inst. L. & Econ. Res. Paper No. 858, U.
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the innovative product of cryptocurrency exchange-traded funds, the
SEC has now signaled willingness to work with other agencies,
namely the Office of the Comptroller of Currency and the
Commodities and Futures Trading Commission to explore how
regulatory ontologies or even reform can be developed to cope with
innovation that challenges existing regulatory boundaries. 272
European level agencies can be particularly well-placed to
orchestrate high-level inter-agency linkages and coordination. The
European System of Financial Supervision (“ESFS”), which
comprises the European Banking Authority (“EBA”), European
Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”), European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority (“EIOPA”), the Joint Committee of
the agencies and the European Systemic Risk Board (“ESRB”)
constituted under the ECB, provides inter-agency linkages and
opportunities for inter-agency learning, dialogue and coordination,
and overcomes the apparently siloed appearance of each agency’s
mandate. 273 Although regulatory linkages are constructed for specific
purposes, inter-agency coordination at the E.U. level and through to
national level bodies, are not institutionally unfamiliar. Perhaps new
inter-agency liaison structures extended from the Joint Committee of
the ESFS can serve as a model for regulatory intersections and
coordination involving E.U. level agencies and national level
agencies. The Joint Committee currently addresses common
objectives, such as anti-money laundering and consumer protection,
both of which are relevant to the dApp economy.
It may be queried whether the ECB and NCBs, which maintain a
stature of independence for the ESCB’s mandates, should be engaged
in such new policy and regulatory intersections and coordination.
However, with the expansion of the ECB’s remit in the Banking
Union, Otmar Issing, for example, opines that “serving the Union’s
wider economic policies” provides a basis for institutional dynamism
Chicago,
Pub.
L.
Working
Paper
No.
683,
2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3265295.
272. Jackie Noblett, Cryptocurrency ETFs under active consideration, says
TIMES
(Oct.
15,
2020),
SEC
Chair,
FINANCIAL
https://www.ft.com/content/9f2c1303-678e-486e-b3f1-d4f234f85f47.
273. See generally Iris H-Y Chiu, Power and Accountability in the EU
Financial Regulatory Architecture: Examining Inter-agency Relations, Agency
Independence and Accountability, 8 EUROPEAN J. LEGAL STUD. 68 (2015).
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for the ECB, 274 as the ECB, though independently instituted for
specific tasks, is not insular in nature from the wider institutional
context for digital transformation in the Single Market, 275 including
the Digital Finance Package 276 that supports the Capital Markets
Union in the European Union. 277 Further, the Banking Union has
brought coordinative channels between the Single Supervisory
Mechanism and the EBA. 278 Further intersection with the ESFS would
be optimal in order to address the enabling and regulative needs of the
dApp economy. The ESCB and the ESFS can be connected for policy
deliberation on dApp economy mobilization and regulation. This can
also lead to new considerations such as whether new regulatory bodies
may be needed, such as the new Maltese Digital Innovation Authority.
The kind of interagency and multi-stakeholder approach adopted
in the Digital Single Market strategy 279 can also provide some
inspiration for a way forward for organizing regulatory intersections
and coordination for policy thinking about the dApp economy.
Hazards can be sounded in terms of the inefficiencies of “too many
cooks” and the lack of definite outcomes after protracted processes of

274. Otmar Issing, The European Central Bank, in SVERIGES RIKSBANK AND
HISTORY OF CENTRAL BANKING (Rodney Edvinsson, Tor Jacobson &Daniel
Waldenström eds., 2018).
275. See generally Bonefield, supra note 228.
276. Orbach, supra note 201.
277. See Capital Markets Union Action Plan, supra note 76; European
Commission Proposal 2020, supra note 154.
278. See generally THE EUROPEAN BANKING UNION AND THE ROLE OF LAW
(Gianni Lo Schiavo ed. 2019). For critical discussions of the relationship between
the SSM and EBA, see Eilis Ferran & Valia Babis, The European Single
Supervisory
Mechanism
(2013),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2224538; Concetta Brescia
Morra, From the Single Supervisory Mechanism to the Banking Union. The Role of
the
ECB
and
the
EBA
(2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2448913; but see Guido
Ferranini & Luigi Chiarella, Common Banking Supervision in the Eurozone:
Strengths
and
Weaknesses
(ECGI
Working
Paper,
2013),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2309897 (positive discussions).
279. European Commission, The “Principles for Better Self-and CoRegulation,” (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/best-practiceprinciples-better-self-and-co-regulation.
THE
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listening to every voice. 280 Nevertheless, Finck’s vision of “coregulation” 281 is arguably necessary due to the novelties and
complexities posed by the new needs of the dApp economy. From
national levels to European levels, regulatory linkages and capacity
need to be considered, in terms of how harmonization or indeed
appropriate decentralization can steer policy initiatives. Such
coordinated regulation can pave the way for inspiring other
jurisdictions with multifaceted regulatory architectures, such as in the
United States, to consider reorganizing and regrouping architectural
linkages in response to new economic dynamism.
CONCLUSION
The dApp economy is an innovative and exciting business space
that is creating economic value despite the lack of regulatory
institutions that support it so far. Indeed, regulatory proposals offered
by the European Commission in relation to stablecoins and cryptoasset offerings in the European Union may be too path dependent and
fail to meet the innovative needs of the dApp economy. This Article
proposes that regulation has a facilitative role to play in mobilizing
this economic space and galvanizing its scaling up and interface with
the conventional mainstream economy. The starting point of such a
facilitative regulatory regime could lie in the issuance of a central
bank digital currency that addresses the weaknesses of the monetary
order in the dApp economy. The European Single Market is an apt
place for the rollout of a central bank digital euro, based on the high
levels of dApp activities in the European Union and its ability to
support harmonized policies across borders within the Single Market.
The issuance of a CBDC in the European Single Market can
provide a departure point for the building out of the dApp economy by
more enabling regulatory institutions, including more appropriate
fundraising governance and other complementary policies for service
providers and new intermediaries. Regulatory institutions, both of a
facilitative and governing nature, are needed to support and mobilize
new economic actorhood, service provision and social trust, and
280. Staff, Europe’s digital single market: Incumbents rule – The European
Union’s online reforms help the old more than the new, ECONOMIST (Sept. 17,
2016), https://www.economist.com/business/2016/09/17/incumbents-rule.
281. FINCK, supra note 2, at 171–180.
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acceptance of developments in the dApp economy. Siloed regulative
developments could be counterproductive without the holistic
integration of an enabling institution for the dApp economy.
Crucially, the enabling “starting point” argued for in this Article, i.e.,
the limited rollout of CBDC for investment in the dApp economy,
would underpin substantive policy thinking and considerations
regarding regulatory intersections and coordination at the levels of
national and E.U. regulatory architecture. This is consistent with a coregulatory and multi-stakeholder approach to policy building pursued
in the E.U. Digital Single Market Strategy. This experiment in the
European Union is also likely to yield lessons for regional and
international coordination, which is important for the global and
borderless nature of the dApp economy.
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